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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Much ink has been shed over the propriety of the use of religious language in 
law-making.2  Some commentators have argued that lawmakers can properly be 
motivated by religious concerns3 or even that they are inescapable; but that a 
                                                                
1Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, and Co-editor, JOURNAL OF LAW 
AND RELIGION.  Howard Lesnick and Howard Vogel have made this a much better article than 
it was going to be, and Pat Keifert and my colleagues on ELCA Church in Society’s Task 
Forces, brought together by John Stumme, are responsible for getting me thinking about this 
topic. Michael Perry’s work was a significant influence, among others, and I must also thank 
Susan DeVos, who did the scut-work well without complaint, aided by Jonathan Miller. 
2See, e.g., Stephen Carter, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 18-101 (1993); Mark Tushnet, 
Religion in Politics, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1131 (1989)(book review); Michael J. Perry, 
MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW 77-104 (1988); Kent Greenawalt, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND 
POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); Franklin I. Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 
J. LAW & RELIG. 325 (1984); Daniel O Conkle, Differing Religions, Different Politics:  
Evaluating the Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 
J.LAW & RELIG. 1, 11-30 (1993-94). 
3Justice Rehnquist, for example,  views “individual moral judgments” as an appropriate 
“springboard” for political action, but they do not in themselves justify a decision; only when 
their followers have become “sufficiently numerous” to pass a law will such moral 
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lawmaker may not rely on religious reasons in making a decision.4  John Rawls 
considers religious reasons a paradigmatic example of “nonpublic reasons,”5 while 
Richard Rorty would want to make it “‘seem bad taste’“ to bring religion into public 
discussion.6  Both Michael Perry and Ronald Thiemann have criticized Rawls for 
insisting that religious arguments cannot be fully shared by all members of the 
polity, and therefore are precluded.7  Thiemann also criticizes Thomas Nagel’s 
position that religious arguments cannot be used because religious people are not 
prepared to make arguments available so that others can make the same judgment as 
they do.8  Others have countered that refusing entry to religious arguments de-
privileges them compared to secular arguments, in violation of both speech and free 
exercise norms,9 or that religious discourse is so important to public life that it is 
incumbent for elected officials not to conceal their religious convictions.10 
In its broad sense, this debate over religious argument in public life arises from 
what David Hollenbach calls “the fact of pluralism.”  As an organic response to “the 
diversity of conceptions of the meaning and purpose of life,”  pluralism, in 
Hollenbach’s view, is likely to be a permanent reality in modern democratic 
cultures.11  If he is right, not to acknowledge such a reality, not to give it moral 
weight in political decision-making, seems not simply foolish, but also wrong. 
                                                          
justifications carry any legal weight.  William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living 
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 705 (1976). 
4For examples of arguments that lead to this or a more radical separatist conclusion see 
MICHAEL PERRY, LOVE AND POWER 9-28(1991) (discussing Kent Greenawalt, Bruce 
Ackerman, Thomas Nagel, and John Rawls). Some who are most outspoken against religious 
language in public life fear a specific antagonist:  a conservative Christian, often labeled 
“fundamentalist,” who believes that divine revelation hands down a specific set of mandates 
about how all people should live.  Some of them have expressed concern that lobbyists and 
lawmakers—labeled “stealth candidates” in local political races—will hide their religious 
motives and plans until they are elected. See, e.g., K. L. Billingsley, ACLU Sues California 
School Board, Charges It Muzzles Public Criticism, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at A4 
(describing religious conservative candidates for school board); Symposium, INSIGHT MAG., 
May 5, 1997, at 25 (describing Christian Coalition candidates); William Safire, Gambling 
Panel’s Foxes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 20, 1997, at B08 (describing gambling 
commission candidate who served on the Family Research Council). 
5MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS 54-58 (1997), 
6Id. at 45, quoting Richard Rorty, Religion as a Conversation Stopper, 3 COMMON 
KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (1994). 
7Id. at 54-61; RONALD E. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR 
DEMOCRACY 124-26 (1996). 
8Id. at 127-30. 
9RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 32-33. 
10See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 166 (1995); 
RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 78 (noting that the Williamsburg Charter drafters called 
for public accessibility of private convictions to engage those who do not share such 
convictions). 
11David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 879 (1993) (citing and quoting John Rawls, The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/4
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Yet, only a few legal scholars have gone past the propriety debate to work out 
what jurisprudence might look like if lawmakers and judges took their religious 
world-views seriously—and explicitly—in their work, in a way respectful of “the 
fact of pluralism.”12  My task is to imagine the concrete case:  what a judge’s 
jurisprudence might look like if a judge considered the wisdom of his own religious 
tradition in constitutional cases.  This article explores broad jurisprudential themes 
and specific First Amendment and social welfare opinions of Justice William 
Rehnquist, who for some years has been a member of a Lutheran congregation, my 
own denomination.  While Justice Rehnquist’s views have moderated over the years, 
and he has become known, partly through the impeachment inquiry, for a judicious 
temperament, I will make a modest case that in his jurisprudence, Justice Rehnquist 
does not take seriously central Lutheran understandings.  (I should be very clear that, 
other than his membership, I know nothing about Justice Rehnquist’s theological 
beliefs or religious practice, and I do not consider them.13  I only suggest how a 
person who accepts Lutheran doctrine, or one “take” on it, would reason about legal 
issues.)14 
Justice Rehnquist is somewhat of a foil here, for he is a good example—but far 
from the only one—of how a judge from a particular faith-tradition may find himself 
not reflecting  elements of that tradition in his jurisprudence.  For instance, Sanford 
Levinson has shown how the American polity has somewhat successfully demanded 
that Catholic justices explicitly renounce any notion that their faith will have 
                                                                
12Most recently, Perry has made the more expansive argument that no reasons that 
lobbyists or lawmakers might give as arguments, motivations, or pivotal influences in their 
decisions are out of bounds; but that a religious lawmaker may rely on his religious belief as a 
ground for decision only if he is convinced that there is a plausible secular reason for his 
action as well.  RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 43-44. In his previous work, Perry had 
made an appeal for politics that were publicly intelligible and accessible, i.e.,”comprehensible 
to those who speak a different religious or moral language—to the point of translating one’s 
position, to the extent possible, into a shared (‘mediating’) language.”  “The virtue of public 
accessibility is the habit of trying to defend one’s position in a manner neither sectarian nor 
authoritarian.” LOVE AND POWER, supra note 4, at 106.  Perry refers to similar arguments from 
J. Bryan Hehir and Richard John Neuhaus.  RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 78. 
13Nor is the article focussed on Justice Rehnquist’s personal moral character or the way in 
which he interacts with others in his professional life.  In some biographical sketches, 
Rehnquist is described as a warm and compassionate person, intellectually sharp and 
courageous, see PETER IRONS, BRENNAN V. REHNQUIST:  THE BATTLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION  
18 (1994); DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT:  THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 
32 (1992); DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT:  CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE COURSE OF 
AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS 4-5 (1991).  In fact, the contrast between reports about 
his personal character and the tone of his judicial opinions was precisely a factor which 
intrigued me enough to begin this inquiry. 
14I happily invite more theologically educated Lutherans to correct mistakes, though I 
believe that the themes I take up are true to and central in the Lutheran understanding. Justice 
Rehnquist’s jurisprudence may well reflect some Christian “story,” if not a Lutheran one.  For 
instance, Sanford Levinson suggests that the remnants of the American Protestant tradition 
held by founding communities can be found in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Sanford 
Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion:  Catholics Becoming 
Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1050, 1054 (1990).  
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
646 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:643 
anything to do with their judicial office, particularly their interpretive task.15  And 
they are surely not alone. 
However, I think that Justice Rehnquist might be a better Justice if he were a 
better Lutheran justice.  That is, his failure to deploy traditional Lutheran ethics to 
understand and speak to the American constitutional situation impoverishes the 
center of his own jurisprudence. Even if he reached many of the same decisional 
outcomes, his willingness to take Lutheran theological insights about the relationship 
between God and humans seriously as he works could lead to a more complex and 
accurate jurisprudence.  In particular, some of his rhetorical moves would be better 
informed by analogical adaptation from Lutheran views of the relationship between 
church, state, society, and the individual. 
The Lutheran position, which many Lutherans distance from Protestantism,16 is to 
be sure often difficult, because it is paradoxical.  However,  it is precisely those 
paradoxes which make this position a powerful tool for gaining insights into the 
seemingly contradictory and complex demands of post-modern society, and the 
human condition itself.  
I realize that such a project is loaded with landmines for both theology and law—
ranging from the central question theistic believers must ask, “is it possible to take 
God out of the picture, even analogically?” to the question people with other beliefs 
about religion might ask, namely, “what hidden theological assumptions might we 
                                                                
15Levinson, supra note 14 at 1062-65.  Justice Brennan was required to answer the 
question, “‘[W]ould you be able to follow the requirements of your oath [to follow the laws 
and precedents of this Nation] or would you be bound by your religions obligations?’“ Id. at 
1062 (quoting Nomination of William Joseph Brennan:  Hearings Before the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1957) [hereinafter Brennan 
Hearings]).  He responded, “‘I say not that I recognize that there is any obligation superior to 
that [oath], rather that there isn’t any obligation of our faith superior to that.’“ Id. at 1063 
(quoting Brennan Hearings, 34). Justice Scalia was required to answer what he might do about 
a deeply held “‘personal moral conviction, which may be pertinent to a matter before the 
Court,’“ and he responded that he had a moral obligation “‘to be bound by the determinations 
of that democratic society’“ and “‘[i]f [the judge] feels that he cannot be, then he should not be 
sitting as a judge.’“ Id. at 1064 (quoting Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia:  Hearings 
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 43 (1986) 
[hereinafter Scalia Hearings]).  Even faced with clearly immoral laws, Judge Scalia 
responded, “‘[i]n no way would I let that influence my determination of how they apply.’“  Id. 
(quoting Scalia Hearings, 43). Justice Anthony Kennedy, responding to a question about an 
admiring remark he had made as “‘a practicing Catholic’“ to Sen. Jesse Helms’ views on 
abortion, stated, “‘Now it would be highly improper for a judge to allow his or her own 
personal or religious views to enter into a decision respecting a constitutional matter.’“ Id. at 
1064-65 (quoting The Questions Begin: “Who is Anthony Kennedy,” N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
1987, at B16). 
16Historian Sydney Ahlstrom recognizes four “traditional” headings for American 
churches which arose out of the Reformation:  Lutheran, Anglican, Reformed, and Radical.  
SYDNEY AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 72 (1972).  Some 
moments in American Lutheranism have emphasized Lutheranism as conserving the best of 
the Catholic tradition against radical and Reformed movements, while others have attempted 
to marry Lutheranism with other Protestant traditions into an “American Lutheranism.”  Id. at 
518-26.  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/4
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mistakenly import as we are trying to adapt a theological idea to a secular setting?”17  
While Michael Perry and others have taken questions of this nature quite seriously, 
particularly the need for respectful process,18 I will first suggest two moves that 
might respond to legitimate concerns about religious influence in the judicial 
process. 
II.  WHEN MIGHT A RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT HELP? 
Taking as true Perry’s position that some plausible secular argument must be 
advanced to justify every political decision, we might ask why a judge’s ability to 
borrow from his religion might make a difference in his opinions. First, a judge’s 
religious understandings may usefully inform the rhetorical elements of his opinion, 
even if it is more problematic to permit such understandings to ground the decisional 
elements of the case.  Second, joining Perry19 and Ron Thiemann20 in viewing 
religious traditions as in part preserving a storehouse of wisdom on the human 
experience, I argue that we can borrow analogically even in a state committed to a 
secularly justified result.   
A.  Rhetorical Elements of Judicial Decision-Making 
Even if Perry is right that a court must justify its decision using secular 
arguments, a judge’s religious views may usefully inform the way in which she 
constructs the rhetorical cast,21 and particularly the forensic and epideictic elements22 
of her opinion.  To be adequate to its authority, the Supreme Court must move 
beyond decisional compromise23 in individual opinions, and even beyond a laudable 
concern for justificatory consistency24 over time. To be publicly persuasive in 
                                                                
17See, e.g., Stephen D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REV. 
583, 604 (1993) (taking up the question whether moral arguments in law make sense without a 
transcendent source or “superlative,” without God). 
18See, e.g., RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5 at 99-101, 105-11, 125-26 (1991). 
19LOVE AND POWER, supra note 4, at 70-75. 
20THIEMANN, supra note 7, at 132. 
21Aristotle defined rhetoric as the “faculty which apprehends the possible means of 
persuasion in any given case” or subject.  ARISTOTLE, SELECTED WORKS 611, section 1356a 
(Hippocrates G. Apostle and Lloyd P. Gerson, eds., Peripatetic Press, 2d ed. 1986)(hereinafter 
cited as Aristotle, at page and section.) 
22See notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text (further explicating the forensic and 
epideictic elements of rhetoric.) 
23Any number of opinions display the results of rhetorical compromise; they speak in a 
multiplicity of rhetorical tongues, reflecting the arguments of each of the Justices whose vote 
was needed to reach the decision.  One oft-cited example of rhetorical compromise is Justice 
Brennan’s opinion in Plyler v. Doe, which borrows from illegitimacy, alienage, and education 
jurisprudence to justify invalidation of a state education exclusion for illegal alien children. 
457 U.S. 202 (1982).  
24Some justices do seem to take pains to display some (if not perfect) theoretical 
consistency over time on issues such as the relationship of the federal and state governments, 
judicial review,  the presumption of constitutionality, and similar issues.  Yet, these patterns 
often assert themselves in concurring or dissenting opinions, rather than the opinion of the 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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history, the Court will need to take more care for both the forensic function of its 
opinions, that layer of argument aimed at convincing the reader that a litigant (or 
lower court) has acted wrongfully or correctly under the law,25 and  the epideictic, 
which is the rhetorical “piece” of an argument that praises or blames one of the 
parties for what has happened.  If it does not carefully construct these elements of its 
argument, the Court can be sure that the public will imply or supply a forensic and 
epideictic text, even if not the one intended by the Justices.26  
Viewing cases over time, it is not clear that the Supreme Court consciously 
attends to the forensic or epideictic functions that the Court’s opinions serve, perhaps 
because the court is still mired in a 19th century conception of law as science.27  In 
the scientific model, the speaker is simply a detached observer, not persuading the 
hearer of the moral strength of his position, but instead finding a cold, hard legal 
truth out in nature, much like isolating an insect in an entomological expedition.  In 
the scientific model, the hearer becomes unimportant, almost unnoticed; and the 
speaker cannot “see” the facts through a particular character or lens, lest he destroy 
the objectivity of the search for truth. A judge committed to the scientific model of 
law would not want to acknowledge that he has personal views, much less religious 
views, for that might skew the “reality” of the legal investigation.  Moreover, to 
acknowledge that he is writing for, say, a public in turmoil over slavery or abortion 
would be to suggest that his rhetoric was aimed at appeasement rather than the pure 
truth.   
A rhetorical jurisprudential model, by contrast, understands both the reluctant 
authority and the invitational force of the constitutional opinion.  Such a model 
recognizes that the Court must decide even those critical matters on which people are 
sharply divided, matters which could easily go one way or another under the 
                                                          
Court, which would presumably have the greatest opportunity for rhetorical influence since it 
is strengthened by the judgment itself. 
25Aristotle distinguished between deliberative and forensic rhetoric. Deliberative speech 
urges people either to do or not do something; lawyers use deliberative speech in this sense, 
while judges rarely do, except when speaking from the bench.  Forensic speech attacks or 
defends actions done in the past.  Forensic rhetoric, chiefly employed by litigants, aims to 
prove some action just or unjust.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 21 at 616, § 1358b. In a judicial 
opinion, forensic rhetoric is used to justify the decision to the reader, but it often waxes far 
beyond justification of the decision. 
26Consider two examples:  
—the popular interpretation of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as a case which decides 
the abortion question on the basis of whether a fetus is a human life; 
      —in the affirmative action arena, the public focus on “third-party innocence”, i.e., whether 
an affirmative action program will harm innocent non-minority employees/applicants, as a test 
of its moral worth derived from cases such as Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
In each such case, the public is in some senses correct that this “kernel” of the abortion 
and affirmative action cases is necessary to the moral resolution of the case; but it is the public 
that has selected that kernel of the Court’s opinion to focus in on the moral debate, with the 
other kernels of the argument receiving much less attention in public discussion. 
27Christopher Columbus Langdell, the first Harvard Law School dean, is credited with the 
development of the “law as science” theory.  See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/4
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Constitution, because someone must decide.  On the other hand, in the rhetorical 
model, the Court decides not as a tyrant, foreclosing all possibilities for action on an 
issue such as abortion, but as a conversation partner, precluding some choices 
because of overriding constitutional values but opening up many more. 
The Court’s moral authority to exercise leadership in a national conversation 
about  distinctive aspects and limitations of American legal justice is blunted in 
absence of deliberate rhetorical design.28  If any evidence is needed, one has only to 
look at the popular view that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade29 was a 
“conversation-stopper” instead of a conversation-starter.30 A more thoughtful, 
nuanced rhetorical strategy in Roe and subsequent abortion cases might, for instance, 
fruitfully have refocussed public attention on harms and hardships rather than 
autonomy and rights. Reframed to the public as tragic situations, these cases might 
possibly have engendered compassionate public responses for both mothers and 
fetuses, rather than the expenditure of vast energies in the battle to challenge or 
defend autonomy rights.   
Especially because Supreme Court opinions have become more accessible to the 
general public through increased press coverage and Internet access, the Court’s 
inattention to the rhetorical aspect of its role is a lost opportunity to create consensus, 
not just around outcomes but also around principles of justice.  A different 
imagination about the Court’s speech—one that acknowledges the particular 
character and role of both speaker and its many audiences—not only opens the 
possibility of dialectical encounter among legally trained advocates of diverse world-
views.  It also bespeaks hope for the possibility that the average person can 
participate positively in critical national debates, not simply respond either in 
passivity or resistance to a loss in the Court. 
Moreover, to ignore the most critical rhetorical fact—that the Court’s audience is 
(at least primarily) the American public—is to invite a grave misstep; for it is the 
peculiarly American construction of notions like freedom, equality and limited 
government that gives a Court opinion its full force.  To be sure, a rhetorical 
imagination often makes things theoretically messier:  for instance, the Court could 
have ignored its Free Exercise and Establishment Clause audience, both non-
religious and religiously diverse in a historically specific way, and achieved a less 
tortured First Amendment jurisprudence.  But that trail of opinions would also be 
less authentic, for words like “coercion” and “wall of separation” take on their real 
meaning only in the context of a people formed in part from religious persecution 
and dedicated to a certain equality of religious belief. 
The Supreme Court particularly neglects the epideictic function of its work, the 
way in which it implicitly makes judgments about the moral virtue or vice of those 
                                                                
28Of course, Justice Rehnquist’s more cynical view that rhetorical arguments may be used 
to “play to the crowd” as political messages might also explain his failure to use them.  See 
SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 297 (describing Rehnquist’s view of Blackmun’s 
concurring/dissenting opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 492 U.S. 490, 537 
(1989)).  
29410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
30Cf., Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 476 (1996) (“Because 
God’s commands need not be rational, logical, or consistent, the response that abortion is 
contrary to God’s will is essentially a conversation stopper.”).  
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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who are before it.31  While one can find the rare exception—e.g., implied disgust at a 
hateful speaker32—more often the Court neglects to blame—or indeed to praise.  
These epideictic signals may be especially important when a constitutional result 
may seem distasteful, for instance, when the Court’s epideictic rhetoric would send a 
clear message of support to those harmed by protected speech.  For example, the 
Court fails to take advantage of an opinion’s epideictic power in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,33 offering the modern test for identifying inciting speech.  As the opinions 
describe the Klan rally without any significant expression of disgust at Klan 
members for their slurs against black people and Jews, the Court almost bloodlessly 
sends only one message—that this speech must be protected—instead of taking the 
opportunity to speak also to those harmed by the Klan’s deplorable message. 
If the Court avoids these opportunities to influence popular opinion about the 
morality of a practice beyond the confines of a particular case, the Court deludes 
itself about its own power. More importantly, the Court’s silence on the morally 
problematical behavior of a litigant, whether it is a state or an individual, may over 
time leave an impression on the public about how they should view litigants in a 
particular class of cases.  The affirmative action cases afford a good example:  if the 
Court implicitly paints white challengers as maligned good guys out to get their 
due,34 and by implication, affirmative action recipients as unworthy and selfish 
recipients of a legal windfall,35 the Court influences many more social relationships 
than the decision itself affects.   
A thoughtful observer of judicial review might, however, argue that Justices 
should not wax profound on either the epideictic or the forensic in their opinions, and 
certainly should not allow religious beliefs to influence these aspects of their 
opinions.  Such an observer might claim that a judge exercises a narrow function in 
the scheme of justice, and any such comments are gratuitous and unnecessary to 
decide the case.36  Of course, most justificatory arguments would also be superfluous 
under this rationale, since only one justificatory argument is necessary for each 
decision, yet judges often attempt to tie up as many justificatory loose ends as they 
can.  Moreover, this concern seems more appropriately directed against a trial judge 
                                                                
31Epideictic or oratorical speech “praises or blames” people or “the existing state of 
affairs,” “aiming at what is noble or disgraceful.”  ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, at 616, § 1358b.  
Aristotle’s example of epideictic speech is those speeches praising Achilles for helping 
Patroclus even though he faced death, while saving his life would have been more expedient.  
Id. at 615-16. 
32See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, MN, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1990)(stating that 
crossburning in someone’s front yard is “reprehensible”). 
33395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
34See, e.g., Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 n.34, 298 (1978). 
35See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 489, 495-96, 499 (1978); 
Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of the Civil Rights 
Struggle, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1022 (1994). 
36Howard Lesnick would also have us ask whether any Justice, or anyone else, actually 
lives by the religious argument he makes, or whether religious-type arguments are usually 
prompted by other gratuitous comments with which the objector disagrees.  Letter and notes 
from Howard Lesnick, May 1997 (on file with author). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/4
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whose role is to decide particular cases, not against the Supreme Court which 
exercises a national governance role. For even if one can contest whether the 
Supreme Court was truly meant to be a governance institution, in modern times it has 
functioned as an equal partner in democratic governance.  For the Court to exercise 
its existing role blind to its own actual power would not seem justified. 
A more important argument, also raised against religious debate in politics, is 
that religion can exercise a corrosive influence on the judicial process, from 
divisiveness to disrespect for minority religions.  However, the same responses to the 
challenges against religion in politics also apply to the use of religious sources 
judicial opinions:  (a) although religion is sectarian and divisive, it is not peculiarly 
so, for many so-called “secular” arguments are also sectarian and divisive; (b) 
although some religious people cannot achieve critical distance on their beliefs 
necessary for a pluralistic, “ecumenical” conversation, many can, and conversely 
many secularists cannot; and (c) although religious arguments can be “subjective,” 
they are no more so, and often less so (since they rely on a historical tradition) than 
many secular arguments.37 Indeed, there have been strong challenges even to the 
assumption that the use of religious language necessarily implies disrespect for 
minority religions.38 
In fact, while there is reason to be more concerned about these issues in judicial 
than political choice, precisely because we imagine the courts to be the reserve of 
impartial, “objective” judgment, there is also reason to think that judges will exercise 
more self-restraint in using religious arguments.  First, as the Catholic judges’ 
experiences point out, judges come with a built-in bias about letting their personal 
views cloud their judgment.  Second, constitutional judges themselves define the 
parameters of the inappropriate use of religion by government—they are the ones 
who have determined it inappropriate for government to impede religious practices 
based on views of the value of a religion, its truthfulness, efficaciousness or its 
American “authenticity.”39  If the judges have developed these standards, we may 
expect enough investment in their validity to assume that judges will apply them to 
each other (i.e., on appeal and in concurring/dissenting opinions), if not to 
themselves.  Third, unlike legislators, judges work in an atmosphere where thorough 
testing of biases and ideas by litigants and other judges is part of the norm, not the 
exception.  Though these constraints do not make the problem of applying religious 
insights worry free, neither do they counsel for full exclusion of those insights in the 
judge’s work in deciding a case. 
A different argument, lodged against a complex rhetorical approach itself, is one 
of competence: judges are not qualified to exercise leadership on forensic or even 
epideictic questions such as who is morally blameworthy for the particular mess 
before the courts.  In this respect, critics are sometimes, perhaps even often, on solid 
                                                                
37See RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 47-48. See also Howard J. Vogel, The 
Judicial Oath and the American Creed:  Comments on Sanford Levinson’s The Confrontation 
of Religious Faith and Civil Religion:  Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107, 
1113 (1990). 
38RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 51-54. 
39Id. at 14-15. 
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ground.40  However, even if we would accept generally that the judiciary is no more, 
and perhaps even less, competent to make moral judgments on the actions of 
individuals and state because of its peculiar elite vantage point, judges are surely 
entitled to do so in three circumstances: 
1.  Where a litigant has engaged in what an overwhelming consensus 
would agree is morally repugnant behavior, especially as it violates key 
constitutional principles such as equal respect and liberty, the Court 
should be as entitled to speak truth about such matters as anyone.  Thus, if 
a state deliberately neglects a dying prisoner, or a Klansman burns a cross 
on someone’s front yard, or a social worker stands by while a child is 
abused, the Court’s failure to speak epideictically signals to members of 
the public that they are similarly excused from the duty of denouncing 
such action. 
2.  Where the Court exercises particular competence on a matter, the 
Court’s expertise should give it warrant for forensic and epideictic speech.  
For instance, values of liberty, due process, even equal treatment, are 
matters in which constitutional courts do have more experience and have 
given more thought than the average person.  Just as we would expect a 
bioethics expert to share what she knows about death and dying, we 
should expect the Court to speak about the harms to certain values that we 
hold dear, even if it decides that the Constitution requires the Court to 
prefer other values to those.  Traditionally, the outcry against the loss of 
such values has been given to the dissenting opinion to raise, but the 
Court’s role as an institution that will speak even painful truth is at least 
tarnished if the majority will not also exercise this function. 
3.  The way in which the Court describes the persons who come before the 
Court can, over time, send a message that they are to be praised or 
blamed, even if the Court does not explicitly use evaluative language to 
do so.  Such a message over time, particularly as repeated in the opinions 
of particular Justices, is almost a foregone conclusion.  For, as David 
Tracy writes, “[e]very discourse expresses conscious and unconscious 
ideologies, whether the someone who speaks or writes is aware of them or 
not.”41   
     Thus, if the state is regularly referred to in disapproving or distrustful 
terms, or religious claimants are implicitly described as potential 
freeloaders out to defraud the government by making religious claims for 
exemptions, over time the Supreme Court will have sent an epideictic 
message that may well be unjustified by any set of facts before the Court.  
Because these unspoken epideictic choices of the Court may even carry 
some weight decisionally—in the religious exemption case, for instance, 
                                                                
40In respect to questions of religious truth, of course, they share their competence with 
other branches of government.  See RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 19 (quoting James 
Madison’s view that “religion is wholly exempt from [civil society’s] competence”). 
41DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 61 (1987). 
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creating a “sincerity” criterion that many unorthodox Free Exercise 
claimants must meet as their part of the burden—it is particularly 
important for the Court to be deliberate, over time, about how such groups 
are described and evaluated through judicial language.  In keeping with 
their responsibilities to the truth, judges need to describe with complexity 
the facts and the characters before them—the good and the bad in each 
person or institution which confronts them.  And it is important than the 
Court’s epideictic views not be hidden, or if they are unintentionally 
hidden, for constitutional critics to expose “the hidden, even repressed, 
social and historical ideologies in all texts, in all language as discourse, 
and, above all, in all interpretations.”42 
In some ways, it is only realistic to expect that religious belief will inform the 
epideictic, if not the forensic, aspects of a judge’s opinion.  As Perry, Greenawalt 
and others have argued,43 individual lawmakers’ attempts to hide what is particular 
about their commitments may be an illusory quest. If they are indeed formed in a 
religious tradition, these aspects of their insight into the world, and their biases on 
matters of principle and policy, may be impossible to eliminate from their framing of 
a response.  And it is perhaps only a matter of fairness that a constitutional reader be 
enabled to spot a religious argument when it appears in another guise. 
Borrowing from a religious tradition can give depth, and possibly even bring 
authority and competence to the Court’s epideictic and forensic arguments that 
merely personal insight cannot give.  Judicial critics sometimes refer to a judge’s 
religiously informed construction of the social landscape as tantamount to his 
personal taste about some issues.  While one may find judges so ignorant of their 
own traditions and communities that religion really is a matter of their taste, the 
rigorous interpretation of a religious tradition is surely more “objective” than the 
judge’s personal feelings or views.   
Religious traditions, at least most of them, have much in common with the 
political tradition from which we derive the meanings of our most precious values.  
By and large, the moral understanding of religious traditions is formed in 
community, often around interpretation of ancient and concrete texts and rituals; it 
has stood the test of time; and it has had the opportunity to change and be changed 
by the concrete problems of the culture(s) around it.44  As just one example, the 
Lutheran understanding of the relationship of church and state has had to speak to, 
withstand, and be forged in the fires of such diverse historical movements as the 
Peasants’ War, Scandinavian nationalism, the English Reformation, the Holocaust, 
and the Namibian struggle for freedom. 
Religious traditions offer a treasure trove for forming and substantiating 
epideictic judgments in a way that does not sound in personal moralizing.  Many 
                                                                
42Id. 
43Religious reasons may be both hard to uncover, and their impact hard to gauge compared 
to the importance of secular arguments, by the legislator himself or a reviewing judge.  
RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 34. 
44See RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 80-81; THIEMANN, supra note 7, at 132 
(“[religious convictions] are present ‘in, with and under’ the myths, narratives, rituals, and 
doctrines of a community”). 
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traditions offer narratives, sometimes wry, often complex, to describe the ways in 
which a civilization is formed, including the ways in which virtuous people are 
expected to behave, and vice is unmasked.45  Some, such as Judaism, Catholicism, 
and Islam, have extensive legal and ethical casuistries to draw from;46 some traditions 
have brilliant theological and philosophical thinkers and complex treatises.47  
Together, these traditions contain millennia of human wisdom, some of which is 
“substantially nonrevelational and even nontheological,” can be “presented in public 
discussions in ways that do not presume assent to them on the specific premises of a 
faith grounded in revelation,” and “can enhance and qualify rationality with 
community experience, intuition, attention to symbol, ritual and narrative.”48 
While religious language in the Court’s forensic and epideictic functions is 
clearly problematical—one has no farther to look than Justice Stone’s famous 
dictum, “this is a Christian nation,”49 to understand its potentially destructive role—
the same rules which apply to any of the Court’s justificatory language can also be 
applied to religiously informed rhetoric, ruling Justice Stone’s comment and others 
like it out of order.  For instance, our expectation that the Court should not 
rhetorically exclude vast portions of the populace from its audience, by implying that 
they do not “count” as citizens, can be applied to religiously informed as well as to 
secular argument that excludes them.50  Similarly, just as a court may use a wide 
range of philosophical/policy arguments to demonstrate consensus on some issue 
                                                                
45TRACY, supra note 41 at 12-14. As examples of epideictic stories from widely varying 
traditions, e.g., ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER, THE COLLECTED STORIES (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 
eds. 1982); AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS (Richard Erdos & Alfonso Orth eds., 
1984).   
46The great legal schools of Islam offer a wealth of perspectives on morality and law, see, 
e.g., Azizah al-Hibri, Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 J. INT’L 
LAW 1, 4-10 (1992); Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in Liberal 
Democracies, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1525 (1996)(passim).  Protestantism, while it has not 
developed a body of “Christian law,” boasts numerous denominational church statements on 
moral issues and monographs by thoughtful theologians.  See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America, The Church in Society:  A Lutheran Perspective (September 4, 1991); 
Lutheran Church in America, Social Statement:  The Church and Social Welfare (June 19-27, 
1968)  
47Those traditions with extensive legal traditions also can draw on the insights of ethicists 
from Thomas Aquinas to Charles Curran, Maimonides to Emmanuel Levinas.  For examples 
of such insights within the Protestant tradition, see KARL BARTH, ETHICS (Dietrich Braun ed., 
Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans., The Seabury Press 1981) (originally published in two volume 
edition as ETHIK I 1928 (Theologischer Verlag Zurich 1973) and ETHIK II 1928/1929 
(Theologischer Verlag Zurich 1978)); STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER 
(1981); H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF (1963); PAUL RAMSEY, BASIC 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1950); JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS (1972); GLENN 
TINDER, THE POLITICAL MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY (1989). 
48RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 81, quoting in part Martin Marty, When My Virtue 
Doesn’t Match Your Virtue, 105 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1094, 1096 (1988). 
49Rector, et al., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). 
50See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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before it, it may also take into account a consensus among religious traditions 
without adopting a sectarian (e.g., Jewish or Calvinist) position on some question.51 
B.  Analogical Reasoning as a Legitimate Method of Reasoning from Religious to 
Constitutional Traditions 
If we accept the usefulness of religious tradition for framing forensic and 
epideictic aspects of judicial opinions, we must still ask how such traditions may be 
borrowed.  Modern legal scholarship has been slow to recognize the use of analogy 
to import religious insights about human behavior, the construction of human 
community, and other areas of mutual concern to both the disciplines of law and 
religion.  Perhaps the most direct analogical adaptations have occurred in legal and 
ethical interpretation.  Professor Levinson, for instance, borrows from the “essential 
tensions” between “Protestant” and “Catholic” in Western thought to help us 
understand Americans’ varying commitments to, and interpretations of, the U.S. 
Constitution.52  Professor Perry has mined a history of interreligious dialogue to 
describe an “ecumenical” politics,53 and has compared judicial review to the 
prophetic tradition.54  Yet other work has richly profited from these religious insights, 
if not always directly by analogy.55  For instance, Thomas Shaffer explicitly uses 
theology to frame the ethics of a Christian lawyer;56 while Milner Ball has borrowed 
biblical metaphors, and indeed whole narratives, to understand substantive law as 
well as the lawyer’s task.57  Some writers publishing in law reviews have recently 
been using religious argument in a more directly deductive way, using the theologies 
of Karl Rahner or Paul Ramsey, for instance, to construct a theological critique of 
                                                                
51Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (illustrating how the “common law” of 
religious traditions can be instructive, used in the court’s forensic and epideictic functions).   
52See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18-53 (1988). Thomas Grey, Joseph 
Vining and Michael Perry explore similar themes.  Smith, supra note 17 at 585-86.  Some, like 
Stephen Smith, are conversely criticizing the use of the theological language of ultimate 
concern in discussing legal interpretation.  Id. 
53LOVE AND POWER, supra note 4, at 83-127. 
54MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW, supra note 2, at 136-45; Smith, supra note 17, at 585. 
55For instance, a number of scholars are working to uncover theological or religious 
assumptions hidden in legal doctrine or jurisprudence. See, e.g., Frank S. Alexander, Beyond 
Positivism:  A Theological Perspective, 20 GA. L. REV. 1089 (1986); Ruth Colker, Feminism, 
Theology, and Abortion:  Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 
(1989); Arthur J. Dyck, Beyond Theological Conflict in the Courts:  The Issue of Assisted 
Suicide, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 503 (1995)(arguing that hidden religious 
assumptions in judicial opinions about suicide are inappropriate); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan 
Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923 (1991). 
56See, e.g., Leslie E. Gerber, Can Lawyers Be Saved?  The Theological Legal Ethics of 
Thomas Shaffer, 10 J. LAW & RELIG. (1993-94); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of 
Atticus Finch, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 181 (1981). 
57See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, LYING DOWN TOGETHER:  LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY 
(1985); MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW (1981); MILNER S. BALL, THE 
WORD AND THE LAW (1993). 
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existing legal doctrine;58  or their own theological arguments about the practice of 
law,59 or particular legal problems such as Free Exercise jurisprudence,60 civil 
rights,61 or criminal law and procedure.62  
Although there is some danger in borrowing from religion in legal 
interpretation,63 the analogical method presents perhaps the most useful way of 
incorporating religious insights into the secular discussion of constitutional issues. 
While a theory of appropriate analogy is beyond the scope of this article, it is 
important to say a few words about why it might be more legitimate to use analogy 
to borrow from religious traditions than theological reasoning deductively applied to 
a legal case. 
To accept the possibility of analogy between a sectarian religious argument and a 
“secular” legal argument is to accept the “similarity-in-difference”64 which is 
analogical reasoning.  It is to accept the notion that two widely divergent systems of 
human meaning might be able to find common referents, common “moments of 
recognition” of that which is both disclosed and concealed in analogical argument.65 
It is just such moments that can illuminate our quest to understand who we are as 
human beings and what we might become as a constitutionally organized 
community. To illustrate with just one example, if as radically different conversation 
partners, we can see theological and secular correspondences on the nature of human 
beings (e.g., that they are self-interested and self-justifying), we can agree to those 
understandings without being required to adopt fully the world-views from which 
they came, the secular economics world of the rational maximizer or the Christian 
world of the idolatrous sinner.  And we can work with such understandings in a 
                                                                
58See, e.g., Robert J. Araujo, Political Theory and Liberation Theology:  The Intersection 
of Unger and Gutierrez, 11 J. LAW & RELIG. 63 (1994-95); R. Conte, Toward a Theological 
Construct for the New Biology:  An Analysis of Rahner, Fletcher, and Ramsey, 11 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 429 (1995); H. Jefferson Powell, The Gospel According to Roberto:  A 
Theological Polemic, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1988);  Joel E. Friedlander, Comment, 
Constitution and Kulturkampf:  A Reading of the Shadow Theology of Justice Brennan, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1049 (1992); David S. Clark, Judge Posner’s Theology and the Temples of the 
Law—The Federal Courts:  Crisis and Reform, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1183 (1985) (book review). 
59See, e.g., JOSEPH ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER’S CALLING:  CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL 
PRACTICE (1996). 
60See Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 782 (1992). 
61See Rachel Mariner, Burdens Hard to Bear: A Theology of Civil Rights, 27 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 657 (1992). 
62See THE CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILTY  A PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING (Crawford & Quin eds., 1991); George C. Thomas III & David 
Edelman, An Evaluation of Conservative Crime Control Theology, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
123 (1988). 
63Steven Smith notes the dangers of assuming that legal interpretation is a “religious 
enterprise,” for instance, see Smith, supra note 17, at 587. 
64TRACY, supra note 41 at 20-21, 92-93. 
65Id. at 20. See also RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5 (describing the indeterminacy of 
shared moral premises as “the mediation of dissensus”). 
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practical way without diverting our attention to whether we can irrefutably prove the 
validity of those understandings using science, logic or other forms of certainty 
reasoning. 
Analogy permits a diversity of meanings to exist independently, refusing to dilute 
any of them to a commonly defined meaning, and permitting each to retain its 
distinctive differences, the complexity and intensity of its understanding of the truth.  
Indeed, it is the strength of analogy that permits illumination of those differences 
critically necessary to the uniqueness of a tradition, without allowing such 
differences to become an insuperable barrier to our understanding each other.  Or as 
Tracy puts it, an analogical imagination 
can remind conversation partners that difference and otherness once 
interpreted as other and as different are thereby  acknowledged as in some 
way possible and, in the end, analogous.  Any one who can converse can 
learn to appropriate another possibility. . . .[T]here exists in every 
authentic  conversation an openness to mutual transformation.66 
In particular, analogy may provide a way of avoiding the battle waged among 
Christians and perhaps others between natural law and revelation as the basis for 
judging the moral validity of positive law.  Analogy gives our pluralistic culture an 
alternative to natural law, for it does not insist on prior agreement that truth 
(including religious truth) is discoverable by observation of the natural world and/or 
human reason, without the need for special revelation or religious commitment. 
(Such an agreement may be more troublesome to many religious people than to the 
non-religious in our culture!)  Nor does it demand the acceptance of a particular 
revelation as a predicate for discussing moral truth.  Thus, analogy permits us to 
dispense with some religious preconditions before we can begin to hear or respond to 
religious arguments in constitutional litigation.  
Religious traditions are particularly important sources for analogy in 
constitutional reasoning in a deeply ambiguous, pluralistic culture like our own 
because religions are “exercises in resistance,”67 particularly resistance to “more of 
the same” that blind adherence to political consensus or tradition can represent. This 
resistance is necessary if humans are going to be creative in generating law that 
reflects the sacredness of their own existence together.  Religious traditions can issue 
a radical challenge to the seductions of the law—the drive to simplify complexity, to 
cling to the past, to resolve the past without responding to the present, to quickly 
identify the needs of two sole litigants with our common aspirations, in fact the drive 
not even to see those litigants: 
Through their knowledge of sin and ignorance, the religions can resist all 
refusals to face the radical plurality and ambiguity of any tradition, 
including their own. Through their most fundamental beliefs in Ultimate 
Reality, the religions can resist the ego’s compulsive refusal to face the 
always already power of that Ultimate Reality that bears down upon us.  
The religions also resist the temptations of many post-modernists to see 
the problem but not to act.  But the religions also join secular 
                                                                
66TRACY, supra note 41 at 93. 
67Id. at 84. 
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postmodernity in resisting all earlier modern, liberal or neoconservative 
contentment with  the ordinary discourse on rationality and the self.68 
Analogy permits the possibility of a conversation between religion and law which is 
at once committed and critical, each challenging the other “through every 
hermeneutic of critique, retrieval, and suspicion we possess”69 without refusing to see 
correspondence where it exists.   
The use of the analogical model permits a religious judge who sees disjunctures 
between the “common wisdom” and his religious world view to refuse the elements 
of that “common wisdom” which jar.  For instance, a religious judge might be 
skeptical of a popular world-view that the human body is personal property.  A judge 
who, working from his religious world-view, understood the human body as sacred 
or “given” could refuse to apply a property metaphor in an abortion, child custody, 
or organ transplant case, this time based on the dissimilarity between religious and 
secular world-views, as analogical reasoning permits.  And still, we might 
legitimately demand that such a judge not justify his decision using the language of 
“sacredness” unless he is prepared to show its acceptance in secular as well as 
religious human rights discourse.70 
Analogical adaptation (suggesting likenesses as well as differences) rather than 
theological inference (applying theological principles or assumptions to particular 
situations) is a more useful way to proceed in critiquing law in a pluralistic society 
for other reasons. 
First, many religious views, including Lutherans’, do not understand most moral 
situations to be resolved by a direct command by God to do action A or refrain from 
A.71  For such believers, analogy represents a better strategy than deductive 
reasoning, because it would be incoherent to argue that a theological doctrine results 
in a particular jurisprudence. For instance, the reasoning that certain judgments or 
outcomes (such as absolute pacifism) ineluctably follow from the Christian faith is 
foreign to the basic Lutheran understanding of faith as a way of seeing a moral 
situation, a way of imagining a new relationship between the self and the neighbor.  
In the Lutheran view, Christian obedience is not ordered in an authority-subservience 
political model, at the command of a Divine Voice, even though law is, in some 
senses, a demand on the self.  Instead, obedience is a way of responding to the gift of 
one’s own freedom,72 expressed in the paradoxical language that we are freed for 
servanthood, freed to be bound in response to the neighbor’s need. It is not a set of 
prescriptions or outcomes.  Analogical reasoning, or the use of metaphorical 
language (to suggest its literary analogue), permits a larger discussion about what 
inference one may draw from an image, a factual situation, or even a moral principle 
than mechanical application of a theological insight might yield. 
                                                                
68Id.  
69Id.  
70Michael Perry makes this case in RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5. 
71Carl E. Braaten, God in Public Life: Rehabilitating the “Orders of Creation,” FIRST 
THINGS, Dec. 1990, at 32, 36.  Lutherans subscribe to a version of natural law, described at 
more length at note 176-78 infra and accompanying text. 
72Id. at 35-36. 
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The potential evil of analogical argument must also be faced: analogy permits not 
only the confusion of multiple possibilities, but the consequent justification of unjust 
action or inaction. Indeed, to take my immediate example, Lutherans have been 
justly criticized as “quietistic” sometimes for their failure to firmly demand 
particular legal outcomes,73 or their failure to act at all in the face of injustice.  And 
some of those who called themselves Lutherans have conversely participated in 
unspeakable injustice, distorting the central claims of the faith while claiming its 
heritage.74 However, these facts do not differentiate Lutherans from others who 
consider themselves bound more unambiguously by the dictates of a sacred text. As 
Lutherans recognize, all human beings, whatever their convictions, are sinners who 
can believe and yet not live up to their beliefs, who can distort the claims of any faith 
and indeed blaspheme the sacred name in causes of their own self-delusion and self-
interest, who can justify injustice even from their own sacred texts.   
Second, it is difficult to know precisely what might be lost in applying 
theological doctrine to a particular human endeavor when God drops out of the 
sentence.  However, any person of faith must understand that loss to be 
immeasurable and even be fearful of the profound disrespect for God inherent in 
such activity.  In a directly theological argument, the limits of human ability to keep 
a theocentric focus can be recognized; but the trustworthiness of theological 
reflection when one moves from a discussion of God’s relationship to us, to our 
relationship to each other (the ethical) is less clear.  Analogical or metaphorical 
application by its method recognizes the incommensurability of talk about the 
creative work of God and talk about human attempts to instantiate that work in 
practical ways. 
Yet, hospitality is better served by an analogical rather than an interpretive 
response to theological understandings.  As many thoughtful writers, among them 
Pat Keifert75 and Michael Perry,76 have concluded, we who are strangers—each of us 
to some other’s particular religious or secular tradition or experience—must all be 
welcomed to a conversation about what constitutes the good.  Welcoming the 
                                                                
73See THOMAS W. STRIETER, CONTEMPORARY TWO-KINGDOMS AND GOVERNANCES 
THINKING FOR TODAY’S WORLD:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TYPES OF INTERPRETATION 
OF THE TWO-KINGDOMS AND GOVERNANCES MODEL, ESPECIALLY WITHIN AMERICAN 
LUTHERANISM 63-64 (1986) (dissertation, Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago).  Karl 
Barth, among others, properly criticized the 20th century distortions in Lutheran ethics that 
separated the worldly realm or kingdom from God’s authority and suggested that the Gospel 
had nothing to do with the worldly realm. 
74Id. at 52-72.These distortions led to “ethical bankruptcy” on social justice and political 
doctrines of a number of German Lutheran theologians during the Hitler era, including the 
Rengsdorft Theses which stated that Christianity had its roots in the German nation and that 
there was no contradiction between allegiances to the Gospel and to the Nazi state.  Id. at 64-
75.  This theological position, however, was met strongly by the Barmen Theological 
Declaration led by Karl Barth and others, who “revitalized the concept of the ‘lordship of 
Christ’ relating it to all of life,” although Barth ultimately broke from the Lutheran tradition by 
understanding law as the will of God manifested by grace and our acceptance of that grace, 
rather than distinct and prior to the Gospel.  Id. at 68-73.  
75PATRICK KEIFERT, WELCOMING THE STRANGER (1992). 
76LOVE AND POWER, supra note 4, at 43-51. 
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stranger is pragmatic (how can a people be governed by a language which they do 
not understand?) and it is ethically demanded.  In a pluralistic democratic culture, 
that ethic is embedded deep within culture, necessary for its survival, and hence not a 
“nice thing to do” but an imperative. 
While analogical argument does not create immediate understanding among 
persons of different faith traditions, it has a greater chance of permitting a wider 
dialogue among people with very different religious understandings.  Just as people 
from different cultural traditions can find meaning in the communal narratives of 
others, analogy permits diverse peoples to find common ground without surrender of 
the particularities of their beliefs, and to bring creative insights into interpretation of 
the analogy itself.  The possibilities for such rich diversity are particularly potent for 
metaphors and other images that resonate in countless fresh ways. 
Analogical argument also has a better chance of avoiding the “trump” syndrome 
at the heart of so many fears about religion in public:  the concern that the believer 
will attempt to triumph over his non-believing or different-believing conversational 
partner by arguing that such a person “doesn’t really understand” the demands of 
God or the claims of a particular religious tradition from which the root meaning is 
drawn. 
Finally, whether one argues that an individual must ethically speak out of a voice 
clear to all in public policymaking, or one welcomes voices of those who cannot in 
conscience speak “ecumenically”, analogical argument permits the possibility of 
common ground without requiring prior agreement on the rules for conversation.  As 
such, it may welcome to the conversation those religious and non-religious people 
who fear that they may have to concede an important truth to be taken seriously. 
III.  SITUATING LUTHERANS IN THE PROTESTANT WORLD 
The situation of the Lutheran Justice faced with a constitutional dilemma is a 
perfect concrete case to explore what specific insights a Lutheran jurist might borrow 
from his faith to understand the human context of the case, and the parameters of his 
role as a jurist. Lutheranism as a body of thought offers a proposal of paradox: 
human beings who are good creations with corrupted wills, worlds of law and love 
that co-exist, and freedom to act that is constrained by gift and service rather than 
rules. 
As Carl Esbeck illustrates, and church-state debates often ignore, there are any 
number of Christian positions on the relationship between the state, the church and 
the individual, even counting only Protestant positions.77  Some religious positions 
have loomed in the background of Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly in free 
exercise cases,78 while others (like Lutheranism) have been largely overlooked in 
constructing church-state paradigms. 
Esbeck and Michael McConnell have situated Lutheranism in a “paradoxical 
position” in their typologies of American religious views of church and state 
                                                                
77Carl H. Esbeck, A Typology of Church-State Relations in Current American Thought, in 
RELIGION, PUBLIC LIFE AND THE AMERICAN POLITY 3 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 1994). 
78Some authors suggest that Puritanism has had a major influence on American law.  See 
id., at 5-6.  Levinson, supra note 14 at 1050, 1054. 
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relations.79  Utilizing H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture to organize modern 
American80 religious views on church-state issues into typologies, McConnell 
situates Lutheranism in the model which he terms “Church Accommodated by 
Culture.”  In terms of prioritizing loyalties to one’s faith and the state, McConnell 
includes in the Accommodated model those denominations who accept “the ordinary 
morality and natural reason of the culture insofar as they go.  But they also recognize 
obligations to a higher standard, not based on the values of the secular world.”81  
Thus, they seek to adhere to both worldly and Christian values, recognizing that they 
are distinct.  While Martin Luther and the Apostle Paul are included in this 
McConnell group, Niebuhr describes Lutherans as part of a distinct “Christ and 
Culture in Paradox” group.82  This “Paradox” group understands the “conflict 
between the City of God and the City of Man,” joining radical Christians in 
“pronouncing the whole world of human culture to be godless and sick unto death,” 
but knowing that they “belong to that culture and cannot get out of it.”83 
Paradox/Accommodated theologies thus take distinctively different positions 
toward the problem of church vs. state loyalties compared with other Christian 
positions.  Unlike Church Apart from Culture groups84 and Church in Conflict with 
                                                                
79McConnell’s project is to describe religious views about how the law should respond to 
their religious, normative demands and “[h]ow far . . . the normative authority of the world 
extend[s].” Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts:  A Niebuhrian Examination 
of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 192 (1992).  Esbeck’s proposal is 
to describe different categories of ecclesiology and philosophy of the state, and how the state 
and church should be related, given those understandings.  Esbeck, supra note 77 at 3-24; cf. 
THIEMANN, supra note 7, at 95-114 (typing liberalism’s critics as sectarian communitarians 
and liberal revisionists).  To avoid confusion, I will be largely following McConnell’s 
typology, mindful that I am losing some of the rich complexity of Esbeck’s scheme that 
focusses on five concerns:   
a. the purpose and authority of government and the nature of the church;  
b. the juridical protection accorded religious speech;  
c. the degree of autonomy accorded a church or other religious organization;  
d. discrimination by the state in the distribution of goods and opportunities [along 
religious lines]; and 
e. juridical protection accorded religiously based conscience.  
Esbeck, supra note 77, at 6. 
80McConnell also adds two historical models of the relationship between Christianity and 
Culture. One is “Church Controlling Culture” or theocracy, the model in which a single church 
“has actual political authority” rather than simply the power to persuasion. McConnell, supra 
note 79, at 218.  The other “Culture Controlling Church”, which McConnell sees in the 
Church of England, “is the view that the church is subordinate to the civil authorities.”  Id.  
Neither of these models is currently recognized in American jurisprudence as an option, 
according to McConnell, except perhaps in cases of church property disputes.  Id. 
81Id. at 209. 
82Id. at 210. 
83Id. (quoting H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 156). 
84McConnell notes that this group is subsumed in Niebuhr’s typology as a subgroup of 
Christ Against Culture.  McConnell, supra note 79 at 194. 
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Culture groups,85 Lutherans do not see themselves as “radical” Christians forced, as a 
matter of worldly polity, to choose between the irremediably evil world and Christ.86  
Unlike Church Apart from Culture groups, such as the Amish and some fundamental 
Protestants,87Lutherans do not feel impelled to separate themselves culturally and 
even physically from the wider society; they do not ask to be let alone by the legal 
system. Indeed, they would resist the Apart denominations’ abandonment of the 
public sphere to secularism conditioned upon the world’s response granting them 
religious accommodations, as the Supreme Court did for the Amish in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder.88  Nor would Lutherans fully align with McConnell’s “Church in Conflict 
with Culture” groups, who choose not to opt out but to live in conflict with the state, 
radically committed to Jesus Christ and his teachings as authoritative for public 
life.89  Lutherans recognize the state not as the evil other, but as a divine gift for 
which gratitude is owed and critique demanded. 
Lutherans would thus similarly reject the response of Esbeck’s “strict 
separationists” who want “a state that is decidedly nonreligious but not necessarily 
hostile to religion”90 and “aspire to government unalloyed by even vestiges of 
religion from bygone days.”91  Whether they are secular, only vaguely religious 
people or Christ against Culture believers fearful of persecution, strict separationists 
try to avoid traditional religious influence on civic or public matters, so that public 
issues such as education, law, and economics are publicly debated in purely secular 
terms.  Rejecting this strict division, Lutherans would want to avoid three outcomes 
Esbeck identifies from strict separationism, which ironically parallel the expected 
outcome of Justice Rehnquist’s views:92 dualistic lives, split between a privatized  
                                                                
85The best comparison with McConnell’s Church Apart and Church in Conflict groups in 
Esbeck’s formulation are the “freewill separationists,” who insist on “soul freedom” or 
voluntaristic religion, which must include freedom from a government incompetent to 
determine which religious world view is correct.  Esbeck, supra note 77 at 10.  Such a 
government, in the freewill separationist view, will prostitute the churches to serve the civil 
power.  Prophetic freewillers who are “calling [the state] back to its true course” have been 
selectively involved in issues of personal morality, such as gambling, pornography, and 
alcohol; peace issues; and social welfare, labor and hunger legislation. Id. at 11-12.   
86McConnell, supra note 79 at 196, 198-99. 
87McConnell notes that these groups are increasingly ending up on the losing side of 
church-state battles.  Id. at 198. 
88406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
89McConnell, supra note 79, at 198-99.  For example, sanctuary movement workers and 
religious objectors to the draft, have “insisted not only that [they were] obliged to adhere to a 
standard of conduct that differs from the government’s, but that the wider society should 
conform to the religious standard as well.”  Such groups, McConnell argues, invariably lose 
when they challenge government on an issue that “matters much” to the government.”  Id. at 
202. 
90Esbeck, supra note 77, at 7. 
91Id. at 8. 
92Esbeck’s strict separationists and Justice Rehnquist’s views on religion tend to lead to 
the similar separation of important human values and experiences, even though Justice 
Rehnquist, rejects the strict separation argument in his Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
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family life and secular public life; a marginalized, trivialized “therapeutic” religious 
life focussed on personal beliefs; and the employment of pragmatic instrumentalism 
and “liberal political theory” alone for public choices.93 
Lutherans would agree with Esbeck’s “institutional separationists” on three 
points: 
A. “[A] universal, transcendent point of reference or ethical system for the state 
exists and is required in order to secure human rights and maintain a republican 
structure of government.”94  Indeed, Lutherans acknowledge the role of natural law 
and the priority of independent human reason about the nature of the good, although 
the state, as organized in positive law, is equally seen as good, however infected it 
may be with human sin.95 
B.  The state must be theocentric but not theocratic.  That is, the state is not 
bound by a set of theological particulars, like a positive law superseding the 
Constitution, yet (paradoxically) the theological worldview of separationists should 
be used as precedent. Church and state should “maintain distinct responsibilities that 
should be honored as each institution fulfills its proper role.”96  Yet, because both 
“the people” and human institutions are fallen, the will of God must be recognized as 
in some sense “higher” law if the state is to have any check .97 
As Esbeck’s typology suggests, Lutherans do not understand divine authority or 
texts as prescribing a jurisprudence or particular legal order.  Lutheranism recognizes 
three major forms of critique of the legal order:  in serious cases, where the witness 
to the Gospel itself is jeopardized by the state, the church must stand in statu 
confessionis, against each and every presumption of the state (as in Nazi Germany); 
in cases of significant departure from the most fundamental presumptions of natural 
law, including the duty to the neighbor, Christians must stand in prophetic critique of 
the state; and in all cases, Christians are obliged to participate as loving 
creator/critics of law, and to use their gifts in service of the community, including the 
state if they have the vocation to do so.98 
C.  Religious people have the duty “to preserve the good in culture and reform 
the bad.”   
                                                          
see, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983)(majority opinion); Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills School Dist, 509 U.S. 1, 5 (1993)(majority); Committee for Public Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 811-12 (1973)(dissenting). 
93Esbeck, supra note 77, at 9.  In addition, strict separationists tend to view  religious 
freedom broadly, to include any philosophically based conscientious objection, and vigorously 
protect consciences from coercion, particularly those of minority religions. Id. 
94Id. at 13. 
95Braaten, supra note 71, at 33-34. 
96Esbeck, supra note 77, at 15. 
97Id. at 13; Human Law and the Conscience of Believers (statement of the American 
Lutheran Church, October 20, 1984). 
98STRIETER, supra note 73, at 9, 45-46, 111, 214, 248-49, 277; Braaten, supra note 71, at 
35.  
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Lutherans and Esbeck’s institutional separatists99 share the view that the 
privatized faith of strict separationists and secularism’s narcissism are a more 
immediate threat to culture than isolated violations of religious liberty that might be 
occasioned by religiously informed pursuit of the good.100  They probably depart 
from others in Esbeck’s category in being much more concerned about the harm civil 
religion can cause to the mission of the church, by potential confusion of social 
expectations and the Gospel.101  While they too believe that faith must be integrated 
into all aspects of life, Lutherans might not precisely advocate “an achievable 
balance between proclaiming eternal values and addressing the present in a practical 
and humble manner,”102  because they would understand these concerns to be 
different dimensions of life rather than extremes needing to be balanced.   
Lutherans would similarly not view the world with McConnell’s Churches 
Aligned with Culture (Niebuhr’s “cultural Christians”), who tend not to see tensions 
between the Church and culture, but “interpret culture through Christ,” and 
“understand Christ through culture,” selecting elements of each which are most in 
accord with the other.103  Unlike Cultural Christians, Lutherans are suspicious about 
borrowing “the highest ideals of our culture” or fully cooperating with the 
government to ensure that shared social and moral objectives will be more 
effectively reached, for they have a realistic view about human distortion of political 
ideas and social progress.  Because of their cautious view about the possibilities for 
social progress in a world peopled by sinners, Lutherans are similarly wary of 
“Church Influencing Culture” groups seeking to “reclaim and uplift the world” 
which in their view is not evil, but perverted and convertible to good.104 
                                                                
99Esbeck defines institutional separationists as agreeing on a universal transcendent point 
of reference for the state, theocentric but not theocratic, viewing religious speech as important 
because the church must influence public policy in an integrated way, and viewing privatized 
faith as a threat to public life while having confidence that a state in which religious language 
is well-heard can still protect minority religions by promoting the values of tolerance and 
civility.  Esbeck, supra note 77, at 12-15.  
100Id. at 14. 
101Id. 
102Id. at 14-45. 
103McConnell, supra note 79 at 204 (quoting H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 
83 (1951)).  
104Id. at 214. Niebuhr describes these groups as Christ Transforming Culture groups.  
Citizens in McConnell’s Church Influencing Culture model are fully entitled to participate in 
public life to achieve their ideas, id. at 215, and “‘political activism by the religiously 
motivated’” is recognized as “part of our heritage.”  Id. at 216 quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In Esbeck’s scheme, Niebuhr’s “cultural 
Christians” and McConnell’s “Church Influencing Culture” groups might be 
nonpreferentialists, who want a nondenominational state that recognizes traditional religion as 
the basis for inculcating fundamental moral virtues necessary to citizenship.  In the 
nonpreferentialist view, religious organizations serve as the foremost mediating institution 
between individual and state, and provide the individual with “a sense of community in an 
often impersonal world.” Nonpreferentialists would permit governmental aid, including 
symbolic aid, to religion so long as there was no coercion of conscience.  Esbeck, supra note 
77, at 18. 
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McConnell believes that the “Accommodated” groups’ views, symbolized by 
Roger Williams, “lie at the intellectual foundation of the First Amendment,” in that 
they recognize the simultaneous corruption of the church and state which occurs 
when the two are aligned.105  Separation of these spheres reinforces the simultaneity 
of a citizen’s allegiance to both spheres while recognizing the difference in claims 
between the civil and spiritual “kingdoms.”  Yet, the Free Exercise Clause is 
available to reduce the dissonance between religious dictates and worldly norms, to 
permit full citizenship in both the civil and religious realms.106  However, 
McConnell’s explanation does not fully capture the tensions in the Lutheran position 
that neither separation nor Free Exercise can fully resolve. 
Luther’s work on the problem of transcendent law accounts for the paradoxes the 
McConnell/Niebuhr/Esbeck typologies identify.  Luther accepts much of the natural 
law tradition:   that human beings have the capacity to reason about their own 
situation and to understand how they must order their lives apart from faith (although 
they do not have the capacity to reach or comprehend God on their own).107  He 
accepts that such a capacity is a gift from God to everyone, not just a chosen few. 108  
Luther suggests, however, that human nature reveals incapacity as well as 
capacity, human wickedness as well as goodness.  He replies to Erasmus that “free 
choice, or the most excellent thing in men—even the most excellent men, who were 
possessed of the law, righteousness, wisdom, and all the virtues—is ungodly, 
wicked, and deserving of the wrath of God[; but] [t]he righteousness of God is 
revealed and avails for all and upon all who believe in Christ. . . .”109  And he further 
declares that in God’s sight, those most devoted to keeping the law in its detail, or 
the “works” of the law, are farthest from fulfilling the law, because they lack the 
Spirit who truly fulfills the law. 110  In that claim, Luther gives insight into the central 
animating paradoxes of Lutheranism, some of which have eluded modern Western 
thought about law and particularly judicial review.   
                                                                
105McConnell, supra note 79, at 210. 
106Id. at 210-211. 
107Braaten, supra note 71, at 34.  
108George W. Forell, Luther and Conscience and The Political Use of the Law in MARTIN 
LUTHER:  THEOLOGIAN OF THE CHURCH 59, 89 (Word and World Supplement Series 2, 1994). 
109Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, in MARTIN LUTHER’S BASIC THEOLOGICAL 
WRITINGS 173, 180 (Timothy F. Lull ed., 1989). 
110Id. at 190. 
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IV.  TURNING TO JUSTICE REHNQUIST:  JUXTAPOSING LUTHERAN THEOLOGY AND 
REHNQUIST’S CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
In my view, Justice Rehnquist’s failure to be Lutheran in his jurisprudence111 
severely impoverishes it.  A review of his work suggests that Rehnquist as a jurist 
fails to accept the theological insights of the Lutheran tradition about the relationship 
between God and human beings.  He also fails to borrow analogically from 
Lutheranism in ways that could lead to a more nuanced version of his own 
principles, and which could bring more complexity to the forensic and epideictic 
aspects of his opinions.   
A Lutheran jurist who thought his faith was relevant to his work would come to 
the table with certain theological understandings about the relationship between the 
individual and the state.  Because these are theological understandings—that is, God 
is a necessary actor in these sentences, and without God, they cannot make any 
sense—Rehnquist might be legitimately subjected to criticism for justifying 
decisions in these ways, but they might serve as important background for the 
forensic and epideictic aspects of his opinions.  More importantly, Lutheran theology 
also leads the way to several somewhat paradoxical positions on the large problems 
of jurisprudence, such as the relationship between the individual, authority, and the 
state, which can be fruitfully borrowed. 
These Lutheran understandings potentially conflict, in important ways, with the 
major themes identified by students of William Rehnquist’s jurisprudence as well as 
some of his public pronouncements on the judicial office:112 
Strict Constructionism:  Internally to his discipline, Justice Rehnquist’s 
interpretive approach to the Constitution is characterized by most scholars as “strict 
construction,” planning a limited role for the judicial use of reason in resolving a 
constitutional dispute.113 
State Sovereignism:  In terms of  relationships of power and authority, Justice 
Rehnquist almost invariably sides with the state, writ large, in conflicts between the 
individual or his group and the state; and the state, writ small, in conflicts between 
                                                                
111Howard Lesnick helpfully notes the distinction between judges who seek to do what 
their religion demands of them, and those who seek to understand the teachings of their 
religion, and to consider what they say about how they should do their job as a jurist. Letter 
from Howard Lesnick (May, 1997) (on file with author).  And, one can, of course, embody 
Christian virtues or even follow denominational expectations without understanding a 
denomination’s teachings; and can understand the faith without living it or even following 
specific religious dictates.  This article does not attempt the former, to describe an ethics of 
Lutheran judging, but it does commingle the questions of what Lutheran judges understand 
about their own role in securing justice, and how they think law and legal institutions must 
themselves be organized to account for both the Creation and the Fall. 
112A former law clerk, Robert Giuffra, identified Rehnquist’s jurisprudence themes as 
deference, interpretivism, and federalism and state autonomy.  IRONS, supra note 13, at 331 
(1994).  Irons reports that one study found that these factors predicted Rehnquist’s votes 
between 85-100% of the time. Id. 
113SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 28-29 (1989)(hereinafter 
Davis); D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 14-17. But see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, The Two Faces of Ultra-Pluralism, and the Originalist Fallacy, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 
679, 690, 692 (1994) (arguing that Rehnquist is more committed to his substantive ideology 
than to originalism or any interpretive theory). 
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the federal and the state government.114  Other writers have described this constant as 
a preference for “order over liberty” or “the rights of majorities ahead of the rights of 
individuals.”115  He has also been termed deferential to the views of other 
governmental actors in his judicial role.116  The one glaring, indeed troubling, 
exception is his fierce protection of traditional private property, which does not 
extend to the protection of government entitlements or benefits as private property.117 
Positivism:  In his understanding of the relationship of law and morality, 
reviewers of his work have found in Justice Rehnquist’s jurisprudence a commitment 
to legal positivism.118  By that, they reference Rehnquist’s belief that there is no 
moral critique available to Americans to substantiate the propriety of particular 
legislation.119 
Thomas Merrill describes Rehnquist as an “ideal pluralist” or “ultrapluralist.”120  
An ultrapluralist understands democratic politics as a process of aggregating or 
summing private, divergent interests and values that are “largely exogenously 
determined, in the sense that they are not much influenced by participation in the 
political process.”121  Public decisions will produce public policies “based on 
compromise [not necessarily] a coherent conception of the common good.”122  
                                                                
114D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 19-22; DAVIS, supra note 113, at 24-26; David L. Shapiro, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist:  A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 294 (1976); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 
RUTGERS L.J. 621, 623 (1994); Glenn A. Phelps & John B Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence:  
Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 573 (1991). It is perhaps interesting that Justice Rehnquist’s first 
memorable case as Justice Jackson’s clerk involved the Steel Seizure Case, in which the 
President’s lawyers claimed that constitutional limitations applied only to Congress, not the 
President. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Rehnquist’s 
lengthy discussion underscoring his uneasiness with such a broad demand for power in his 
book THE SUPREME COURT is telling. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 63-64 
(1987). 
115Merrill, supra note 114, at 632; Shapiro, supra note 114, at 294. 
116Davis, supra note 113, at 17-19. 
117Mark Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1329-30 (1990) 
(book review) (suggesting Rehnquist’s positions are more consistent with a Republican 
ideology than a pure federalist one). 
118See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 113, at 23-24.  Tushnet disagrees, noting that Rehnquist 
does not uphold fundamentally wrong legislation such as private property takings. Tushnet, 
supra note 117, at 1331-32. 
119See DAVIS, supra note 113, at 26, who asserts that Rehnquist is a moral relativist.  
Federal Judge William Justice, who agreed with this assessment in replying to Justice 
Rehnquist’s 1976 speech, argues that relativism was foreign to the Framers, and even went 
beyond Holmes’ views in his critique of Justice Rehnquist, entitled “A Relativistic 
Constitution.”  IRONS, supra note 13, at 333-34. 
120Merrill, supra note 114, at 631.  But see Zeppos, supra note 113, at 680-84 
(characterizing Rehnquist as an originalist ultra-pluralist, not a dynamic ultra-pluralist, 
sometimes enforcing the expectations of the original legislature rather than a later one). 
121Merrill, supra note 114, at 626. 
122Id. 
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Democratic institutions reflect “an accurate weighing of majority and minority 
interests” more than any other outcome.123 
In the ultra-pluralist view, judges function as a branch of this system, acting “on 
exogenously-determined values and reach outcomes based on bargaining and 
compromise.”124  They are moral skeptics; that is, they think it is not meaningful to 
speak about the common good, only about an individual’s personal tastes and 
preferences.125  Thus, even a discussion among Justices about the majority and 
dissenting opinions would be unavailing, as values are not shaped by dialogue.126 
However one packages this set of views, if rigidly applied,127 they are inconsistent 
with the theological values that inform Lutheranism. 
A.  Strict Construction vs. Law as Gift:  Toward Affirming Universal Suspicion 
A Lutheran View:  Law, and the state, are a gift from God, but not a command 
from God.128  Political authority is an order of creation, a means by which God 
preserves humanity by ensuring order, peace and justice in the world,129 but its direct 
progenitors are human.  Thus, (paradoxically) law is always suspect as the creation 
of human beings “deserving of wrath,” for the natural law discoverable by means of 
human reason is always obscured by human evil.130  Or as Luther would say, Satan 
blinds reason to the natural law.131 
A constitutional judge’s view of his own internal discipline depends in large part 
upon his views about two related issues:  the judge’s faith in the power of reason, 
and the legal body in which that faith is located. On the bench and within the 
academy, both some interpretivists and non-interpretivists largely distrust human 
reason and emotion, and they divide only on whom they most distrust and where 
they will place authority in the wake of reason’s default.  Interpretivists’ skepticism 
over the ability of human reason to find the good is largely focussed on judges.132  In 
                                                                
123Id. 
124Id. at 628. 
125Id. at 629. 
126Merrill, supra note 114, at 634-35. 
127Of course, any jurist might from time to time express the concerns that inform 
positivism, statism, and strict construction without applying these concepts ideologically or 
predominantly. 
128Braaten, supra note 71, at 33-35. 
129Christian Faith and U.S. Political Life Today 2 (ELCA Teaching and Discussion 
Resource 1995) (describing the role of Government to “maintain peace, to establish justice, to 
protect and advance human rights, and to promote the general welfare of all persons,” (quoting 
The Nature of the Church and Its Relationship with Government (CALC, AELC, LCA 1984)). 
130Braaten, supra note 71, at 34; Christian Faith, supra note 129, at 2. 
131Human beings are also blinded to their own nature; as Luther explains, “[t]his 
hereditary sin [original sin, which bears all subsequent evil deeds] is so deep a corruption of 
nature that reason cannot understand it.  It must be believed because of the revelation in the 
Scriptures. . . . “  The Smalcald Articles, Lull, supra note 109, at 516. 
132See, e.g., Harry M. Clor, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Balances of Constitutional 
Democracy, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 557, 563 (1994).  Rehnquist understands the Court’s Equal 
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the most extreme cases, they reduce judicial review to searching out the beliefs of the 
framers (intentionalism) or rubber-stamping the presumed will of the current 
population (using the so-called majoritarian presumption).133  Justice Rehnquist’s 
judicial skepticism regularly results in this sort of response, along with severe 
epideictic criticism for his fellow judges, whom he has compared to “platonic 
guardians” and Pontius Pilate.134  If the individual citizen is not to be trusted, surely 
the jurist who appears as no more than an individual wolf in law’s clothing should 
not lay claim to any special expertise on justice nor should he be self-righteous about 
his calling.  As Justice Rehnquist describes some judges: 
[T]hey are a small group of fortunately situated people with a roving 
commission to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and state and 
federal administrative officers concerning what is best for the 
country. . . .If there is going to be a council of revision, it ought to have at 
least some connection with popular feeling.135  
For mistrustful statists, the judicial role is to tell the litigants what the majority, or 
their elected representatives, would have told them if the majority could have packed 
into the courtroom, and not much more, although even Rehnquist will concede that 
“[a] merely temporary majoritarian groundswell should not abrogate some individual 
liberty truly protected by the Constitution.”136 
Non-interpretivists who also distrust human reason tend to assume a skeptical 
stance largely toward the legislative and executive branches. Where interpretivists 
distrust the elitism, emotionalism, and arrogance of judges, these non-interpretivists 
assume that legislative and executive action is often the product of power-lust, greed, 
bureaucratic insensitivity or popular resentment against government employees and 
minorities.137  For some rights advocates, the jurist’s task is to stand as a shield 
                                                          
Protection jurisprudence, for instance as “an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a 
series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle.”  Irons, supra note 13, at 
247 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977)).  
133See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and 
Institutional Design in State and Local Government, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 657 (1994); William 
G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform Application of ‘Neutral Principles’ in the 
Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 32 St. LOUIS U. L. J. 263 (1987).  
134See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 13, at 252 (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 
U.S. 449, 525 (1979)).  For their judicial activism, Rehnquist has also accused his colleagues 
of borrowing ideas from George Orwell’s 1984; and escape artist Houdini.  Id. at 261 
135Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 698. 
136Id. at 697 (emphasis added). 
137See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Interest Group Theory and the 
Founders’ Design, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 577, 593 (1994) (discussing judicial insulation from the 
interest group process).  Such groups may also differ on whether national or state power is 
most trustworthy, as demonstrated by the debate between Anti-Federalists, who believed that 
smaller, more homogeneous states would enhance civic virtue; and Federalists, who thought 
that larger, more heterogeneous constituencies would reduce the possibility of minority or 
majority factional oppression.  See Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court as a (Counter) 
Majoritarian Institution:  Misperceptions of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, 1994 
DET. C.L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1994). 
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between the oppressiveness of government and the vulnerability of the individual,138 
and his obligations are limited only by the sharp edges of the constitutional text, the 
finitude of judicial power, the limits of judicial wisdom, and practical matters such as 
knowing who is telling the truth in a particular case.139  For some “critical legal” 
theorists, majorities and power-holders are suspect, while minorities and powerless 
people are not,140 except as they have false consciousness.  Thus, in one feminist 
critical model, men are oppressors and women are victims; the patriarchy silences 
women who demand reproductive rights,141 but feminist collectives cannot wield 
abusive power over women who disagree with the feminist platform.  Again, the 
contrast between good and evil is sharp: the patriarchy rarely does good, and 
feminism rarely does evil. 
Still other interpretivists and non-interpretivists have a high regard for the ability 
of human reason to resolve individual and social problems.  They want to believe 
that lawmakers, if they only spend time reflecting without the taint of constituent 
interest or bias, will eventually discover the course for the common good.  Many 
interpretivists locate these civic virtues in legislators, mouthpieces for the full range 
of human concerns that their constituents hope to express in legislation.142  Non-
interpretivists often locate civic reasoning in the judicial process.143  In their view, 
judicial review is legitimated by the judges’ distance from the fray of politics and by 
their power to use Prof. Bickel’s “passive virtues” and 14th Amendment review to 
demand full rational re-consideration of laws by legislatures.144  Some pro-reasonists 
imagine the individual as innocent by nature compared to the corruptibility of 
corporate bodies, such as bureaucracies and legislators, and presume that the 
individual, if left to his own devices, will more often than not do the right thing by 
his neighbor.  They represent a distinct contrast to many statists who suspect the 
                                                                
138See ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.:  FREEDOM 
FIRST  125-30 (1994)(describing Justice Brennan’s comparable “rights” views). 
139The rights model can perhaps most clearly be seen in the Warren Court development of 
criminal procedural protections for individuals.  For examples, see GOLDMAN & GALLEN, 
supra note 138 at 179-192. The narrative summary in the development of those protections is 
that the police are so tempted toward oppression for the sake of controlling criminals that the 
only antidote is to take away their power to imprison each time they step out of line. 
140Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L. J. 1, 29 
(1987); Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1083 (1986). 
141See Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. 
REV. 793, 795-96 (1991). 
142For instance, Merrill claims that Justice Scalia posits “that legislative judgments reflect 
an imminent rationality—a single coherent truth about the nature of mankind and the proper 
ordering of human relationships.”  Merrill, supra note 114, at 662. 
143See generally Owen Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (1990); 
Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, 1509 (1988).  Obviously, it is possible 
to create a complex matrix using the trust/distrust and judicial/legislative/executive categories, 
even without qualifying them; but most theorists betray a preference for trust/distrust in the 
rhetorical choices they make.   
144See D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 18 (arguing that the “keepers of the covenant” rationale 
is embraced by them as well). 
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individual for his own self-interest; some think democracy’s virtue is in canceling 
out self-interest (or at least making it irrelevant) through majoritarianism.  For 
statists, the state can do no wrong, and individual citizens are suspect for raising any 
questions about whether the state’s activity is proper. 
The pure positivist approach, by contrast to all these theories, suggests that no 
particular locus of power, individual, group or state, is subject to particular 
suspicion; and none entitled to claim the moral high ground.  In a purely positivist 
conception, morality is a private irrational activity meant for private space; and in the 
public arena, where no values can be demonstrably true, only a sustained 
commitment to governmental process will provide community security for law. At 
their most extreme, some interpretivists and non-interpretivists, such as Judge Bork 
and Justice Rehnquist, sound like non-cognitivists: they muse that maybe there is no 
such thing as right, even for the individual; there is only what individuals want and 
feel.145  
Lutheranism enlists the paradox of affirming, universal suspicion toward power 
(ideological and practical) and its corruption in the individual and in society. 
Lutherans affirm the world: they believe that human beings, and their governmental 
and other structures of relationship, are a creation of God and therefore have the 
capacity to reason about their situation and the common good.  This fundamental 
sense that God made human beings (and through them human institutions) and found 
them good underlies any critical interpretation of individuals or structures; Lutherans 
reject profound, radical skepticism about the human ability to create any government 
that can do good, or participate in any sustaining and nurturing human activity. Nor 
is pure positivism a solution, for moral concern is always, in the Lutheran 
conception, a necessary part of governing. 
On the other hand, Lutherans are universally skeptical of all human activity, 
whether individual or bureaucratic, as in bondage to sin; the tremendous gifts of 
thinking, speech and action with which human beings have been endowed are 
mediated through a corrupt human will.  Thus, boundless faith in the capacity of 
individual or even collective human reason to fully understand the human condition 
or to deduce the programme that will perfect human nature, or human institutions, is 
equally misplaced.146  Liberationists are as suspect as authoritarians in this model, 
individuals as much as governments.147  This paradox—that it is possible to affirm 
and to be suspicious at the same time and about everyone—can be borrowed without 
the theological predicate or story of origin, although it must be borrowed 
analogically, due to the disjunctures between the relationships of God to humans, 
and humans to humans. 
Justice Rehnquist’s interpretive approach to the Constitution, most often 
characterized even further as “strict construction,” evidences none of these Lutheran 
premises. As a general matter, Rehnquist combines strict construction with 
textualism,148 arguing for application of the plain meaning of the text, although he 
                                                                
145See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L. J. 1, 8-11 (1971); Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 317. 
146Braaten, supra note 71, at 36. 
147STRIETER, supra note 73, at 30, 243 (discussing Robert Jensen’s views). 
148See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Rasmussen, 440 U.S. 29, 36-
37 (1979)(rejecting plaintiffs’ “tortuous” construction of statutory language to effectuate 
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will fall back on intentionalism149 or structuralism150 in the case of clear ambiguity.151  
In Dworkin’s view, strict construction depends on the assumption that “what the law 
is” is a matter capable of objective interpretation,152 that the interpreter himself (or 
the power of his reason) is not part of the interpretive process if he narrowly reads 
the words of the text.  Rehnquist apparently agrees with this assessment.153  
Yet, if both interpretivism and textualism can be signs of judicial denial, strict 
construction textualism is potentially the most powerful form of denying the place 
and the danger of the human will.  Whereas an intentionalist must at least reconstruct 
a human context and set of ideas specific to historical characters to give evidence for 
his argument, a textualist purports to “find” the meaning of language apart from a 
human context, within a “science” of linguistic understanding.  (Prof. Stephen Smith 
points out similar problems with some intentionalism theories, quoting a number of 
modern interpreters for the proposition that intentionalists are not really trying to 
discern the historical author’s voice.)154 
                                                          
congressional intent for the “plain language and legislative history” of an amendment to a 
workers’ compensation act); Davis, supra note 113, at 28 n.11 (quoting Paul Brest who notes 
that strict textualism is one of the most extreme forms of originalism).  Tushnet argues that 
Rehnquist’s federalism is structural, in contravention of a strict textualist approach.  Tushnet, 
supra note 117, at 1333. 
149Compare SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 150 (noting Rehnquist’s skepticism with Ed 
Meese’s “original intent” theories) and Clor, supra note 132, at 559-60 (1994) (noting 
Rehnquist’s distinction between specific authorial intentions and broad principles); with 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (school meditation or prayer legislation) 
(Rehnquist attacks the “wall of separation” metaphor and “its mischievous diversion of judges 
from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights”), and Weber v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179 (1972) (Rehnquist castigates fundamental rights doctrine as a 
“judicial superstructure . . . engrafted upon the Constitution itself,” while he advocates for 
determination of rights based on the choices of “[t]hose who framed and ratified the 
Constitution”). But see Phelps and Gates, supra note 114, at 589, 591 (noting strong 
preference for doctrinal arguments by both Rehnquist and Brennan; relatively small difference 
in textual versus extrinsic arguments by both). 
150Clor, supra note 132, at 561-62 (citing Davis, supra note 113, at 33-35). 
151Phelps and Gates, supra note 114, at 585.  Ironically, the pragmatism Justice Rehnquist 
employs against affirmative action programs is not employed in judicial review.  In 
Rehnquist’s book, THE SUPREME COURT, he notes both the way in which public opinion and 
judicial temperament influence cases. Joseph S. Larisa, A Supreme Court Primer for the 
Public, 1988 DUKE L.J. 203, 205, 207 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 
SUPREME COURT (1987)). Merrill disagrees with the characterization of Justice Rehnquist as a 
textualist, citing cases in which he will fall back from “plain meaning” if contradicted by 
legislative history and background.”  Merrill, supra note 114, at 651-52.   
152D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 14-16 (citing DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-22 
(1977)). 
153Davis, supra note 113, at 108 (belief in fixed meaning of the Constitution, which is “a 
set of rules rather than a vision of a good society”); see Larisa, supra note 151, at 208 (quoting 
Rehnquist’s view that personalities should not “encroach” into the judicial process, and 
feelings that a law is silly are easily translated from “visceral reactions” into 
unconstitutionality decisions). 
154Smith, supra note 17, at 594-95. 
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The purported objectivism of which Dworkin speaks blinds the judge himself to 
the prejudices and values he brings to bear on the text,155 not requiring him to locate 
himself in relationship to the human beings and context of the case.  The 
presumption is doubly arrogant in that the strict construction textualist often 
simultaneously berates non-interpretivists for their own injection of “personal 
values” into the decision-making process. Thus, the “human” part of judicial 
interpretation can be obscured or elided; and the dual nature of human understanding 
as gifted and flawed likewise buried.  As intentionalists probe a rich conflicting 
treasure of characters and events to explore the dynamics of an interpretation, 
textualists look at a desert in which one fixed, unchangeable meaning survives for 
the past, present, and future. 
In his textualism, Justice Rehnquist provides little evidence that he accepts the 
Lutheran paradox of affirming, universal suspicion in doctrine or its application to 
cases.  Perhaps the most powerful example of Justice Rehnquist’s strict construction 
textualism is his “bitter with the sweet” approach, first formulated to limit judicial 
review of due process,156 but then loaned to other areas such as commercial speech.157  
Rehnquist explains that “where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably 
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in 
determining that right, a litigant . . . must take the bitter with the sweet.”158 Combined 
with Rehnquist’s view of textual interpretation, which requires that one must “stop 
[at the statute’s text] if the text fully reveals its meaning,”159 his version of strict 
construction precludes any challenge to the effects of a statute ostensibly “clear” on 
its face.  A court or executive officer may not challenge whether Congress acted 
wrongfully or mistakenly in constructing a resolution of the public concern it faced; 
and a litigant may not challenge the wrongful or unwise application of that statute to 
his own situation through a due process hearing. 
Loudermill, the case that overturns Rehnquist’s use of the “bitter with the sweet” 
metaphor, is a potentially compelling case to illustrate its problems, because, in one 
reading of the facts, the case results not even from evil intention, but from 
                                                                
155As Spaeth and Teager suggest, “most people who have reached adulthood no longer 
believe [the] myth [that judges only find and do not make law] anyway.”  Harold J. Spaeth & 
Stuart H. Teager, Activism and Restraint:  A Cloak for Justices’ Policy Preferences, in 
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 297 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 
1982). 
156Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 
496 U.S. 498, 527-28 (1990) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (guarantee of Medicaid “reasonable 
and adequate” rates places limitation on rate review to Secretary’s review); Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 559 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Heckler v. Ringer, 
466 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1984) (claimants’ due process complaint that they are required to 
undergo hearings which in every case results in a determination that Medicare should pay for 
their operations is inseparable from the substantive claim that the Secretary must pay for the 
operations, precluded by exhaustion policy).  See also Davis, supra note 113, at 102-09. 
157See, e.g., Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 
346-47 (1986) (if state can ban “vice activity,” it can ban commercial speech about such 
activity). 
158Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153-54. 
159Wilder, 496 U.S. at 526 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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administrative mistake.  In Loudermill, the government asks what is apparently a 
simple question—whether the applicant has been convicted of a felony—and 
Loudermill answers what he honestly believes, that he has not.  Had the state 
constructed the question more carefully, to ask if Loudermill had been convicted at 
all, Loudermill might have disclosed what he thought was a misdemeanor theft 
conviction, which turned out to be a felony.160  And yet his legal mistake—that his 
crime was a misdemeanor not a felony—is judged to be a lie; and he must lose his 
job, under Rehnquist’s approach with no constitutional recourse to explain the 
mistake.  Similarly, in Fritz, strict constructionist Rehnquist refuses to look at 
legislative context to see whether Congress was indeed misled to believe that it was 
not taking vested benefits away from any retired railroadmen:161 
[T]he plain language of [the statute] marks the beginning and the end of 
our inquiry . . . where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress’ 
action, our inquiry is at an end.  It is, of course, “constitutionally 
irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision 
. . .” because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate 
its reasons for enacting a statute. . . . if this test [whether Congress was 
unaware or misled by groups appearing before it] were applied literally to 
every member of any legislature that ever voted on a law, there would be 
few laws which would survive it.162 
Rehnquist’s willingness to brush aside government mistakes that result in human 
hardship is paralleled by his refusal to inquire into more serious, intentional attempts 
by the government163 to circumvent the law or to harm individuals. In the area of 
religious liberty and establishment jurisprudence, Rehnquist has been also 
unrelenting in refusing to question whether the government’s motives for 
suppressing or assisting religious expression are compatible with the concerns of the 
First Amendment.  In Establishment Clause cases, Rehnquist has called for an 
evisceration of the “secular purpose” prong of the Lemon test, in line with his view 
that government neutrality is a fiction not to be found in the Framers’ intentions.164  
In his view, any legislative reason offered is sufficient to end judicial inquiry, even 
in statutes where there is clear evidence that the legislature mixed impermissible 
reasons (e.g., to endorse Christianity) with permissible reasons.165  In arguing for the 
                                                                
160Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 535. 
161In Justice Brennan’s view, U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 
(1980)  is a case of legislative mistake, in which Congress was misled.  Id. at 194. 
162Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176, 179 (citations omitted), partially quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960). 
163For that matter, Rehnquist seems indifferent to intentional individual actions that harm 
persons. See infra notes 278-97 and accompanying text; Savage, supra note 13, at 32, 37. 
164D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 84; David Schimmel, Education, Religion & the Rehnquist 
Court:  Demolishing the Wall of Separation, 56 EDUC. L. REP. 9, 15 (1990) (Establishment 
Clause prohibits establishment of national religion and discrimination among sects). 
165See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(Rehnquist states, “The purpose prong means little if it only requires the legislature to express 
any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references, because legislators might do just that.  
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right of a state to require the posting of the Ten Commandments in Stone v. 
Graham,166 and in the school prayer cases, Rehnquist has said that a secular purpose 
stated on the face of the statute is sufficient to deflect judicial inquiry, even when 
that secular purpose would seem thin compared to the religious ones.167  
In the Free Exercise area, Rehnquist has supported the use of a “reasonableness” 
test for evaluating state restrictions on even religious worship, negating the 
opportunity for an inquiry into government dislike for minorities and their 
concerns.168  Indeed, though a case of blatant discrimination against a minority 
religion is in his view forbidden by the Framers’ intent,169 such discrimination has to 
be unquestionable, as demonstrated when he dissented from a holding that 
Minnesota’s religious solicitation statute was unconstitutional despite legislative 
history indicating that it was directed against Moonies.170 His position is a mixed 
blessing for majority religions:  on one hand, he believes that government may 
accommodate religion, but on the other, where a state or the federal government has 
decided to limit freedom of religion, Rehnquist is deferential to that decision.171 
In the case of public benefits, Rehnquist’s strict construction textualism similarly 
leads him to decline the opportunity to look for government prejudice, disinterest or 
outright mean intent.  In Jefferson v. Hackney, for instance, he truncates inquiry into 
Texas’ decision to grant disparate welfare grants to recipients of old age, blind and 
disability assistance (who statistically were largely white); and AFDC assistance 
                                                          
Faced with a valid legislative secular purpose, we could not properly ignore that purpose 
without a factual basis for doing so.”); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 603 (1988) 
(even if part of Adolescent Family Life Act was motivated by “improper [religious] concerns,” 
statute will survive if also motivated by “other, entirely legitimate secular” concerns); Richard 
A. Brisbin & Edward V. Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny:  Coalitional Conflict in the 
Rehnquist Court, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1049, 1075, 1077, 1083 (1992); Schimmel, supra 
note 164, at 11-14 (noting that Rehnquist views the primary effect prong similarly). 
166449 U.S. 39, 43 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
167See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610-36 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (state private school tuition deduction 
program; the Court will not attribute unconstitutional motives to the state “particularly when a 
plausible secular purpose for the state’s program may be discerned from the face of the 
statute”). In his dissent in Wallace v Jaffree while expressing the skeptical view that the 
purpose prong is easily evaded simply by an expression of secular purpose in the legislative 
history, Rehnquist nevertheless notes, in a somewhat restated form, “we could not properly 
ignore that purpose without a factual basis for doing so.”  472 U.S.  108 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
168See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-52 (1987); Brisbin & Heck, 
supra note 165, at 1066. 
169D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 86; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment, joined 
by Rehnquist, J.) 
170Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 264 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
171See D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 84-87; Schimmel, supra note 164, at 18. Rehnquist has 
also expressed displeasure with incorporation of the Religion Clauses. Thomas v. Review Bd. 
of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721-22 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); D. 
Davis, supra note 13, at 91-94. 
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
676 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:643 
(who were largely black and Mexican), as fortuitous rather than intended.172 On one 
hand, he declares that there is no evidence of such intent; on the other, he bans such 
as inquiry as a matter of law. 
This refusal to explore the context or human dynamics of law-making gives lie to 
the Lutheran suspicion that all human activity, including the work of human 
governors, is infected with sin, whether it is indifference to human suffering, 
ignorant prejudice, or even malice.  It refuses the notion that suspicion must be 
leveled universally, a notion that can be borrowed analogically into judicial decision-
making. Luther’s call for the ruler to “maintain an untrammelled reason and 
unfettered judgment” with respect to other public officials173 cannot be fulfilled if the 
judge refuses to investigate or to judge.  Whether it is the individual Jehovah’s 
Witness leafletting a city street, a collective of women advocating for their rights, or 
the tremendous power of the federal government itself, Lutheranism cautions 
skepticism about how human beings will justify their own actions and wield their 
power.  In the Lutheran conception, then, “rights” would not be assigned by 
determining who are the good guys and who are the bad guys; they would be 
assigned to uphold and nurture the human being, on one hand, and restrain his evil 
ways on the other.   
Similarly, the problem of judicial responsibility is framed by the paradox of 
human beings who are both God’s creations and thoroughly sinners.  Because the 
jurist is skeptical as well about the powers of his own reason, he/she must design an 
understanding that incorporates respect for other governmental institutions having 
distinct responsibilities with a self-critical decision-making process that is always 
inspecting the judge’s own prejudices and commitments.  However, using the 
doctrine of orders of creation, a Lutheran jurist might not approach such a problem in 
the radically skeptical way that strict judicial constructionists have done, by defining 
the judicial office over against the other locations of power within government.  
Rather, the Lutheran position would construct a positive vision of the role of the 
judge, both in restraining evil and in providing for the nurture of the community.  
The “conservative” view of judicial interpretation uses the term “judicial restraint,” 
which suggests that the jurist knows better than the legislature but forces himself not 
to overrule them for some higher good; or “judicial deference,” which suggests an 
uncritical bow to boundaries of legislative power.  By contrast, a Lutheran jurist 
would have a developed theory about the ways in which each branch of government 
performs a peculiar task in the preservation and ordering of the world, recognizing 
the office of the other governors within the system, while at the same time retaining 
a critical perspective and relationship with each.  
                                                                
172406 U.S. 535 (1972). As Justice Marshall points out, these disparities continued 
because, as state officials put it, AFDC “is politically unpopular,” despite dramatic statistics in 
the racial make-up particularly of the old age program (roughly 2/3 white and 1/3 non-white) 
versus the AFDC program (roughly 87% black or Mexican). Id. at 575 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). See also Jerome M. Culp, Understanding the Racial Discourse of Justice 
Rehnquist, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 610-11 (1994). 
173On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 700. 
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Moreover, the giftedness which marks a Lutheran understanding of law174 is 
largely absent in a textualist approach.  In one narrow sense, textualism attempts to 
express the humility of the reader not as a constitutional creator but a constitutional 
recipient. Textualism looks at constitutional meaning as a given:  the text is there, it 
does not reside within or come from ourselves, and we are stuck with it.  We have to 
live with its demands, even when we would do otherwise for short-term gains; we 
have to live with the  specific tradition from which the text came, for it is ours, even 
if we would remake it. 
But in another, more important sense, textualism (unlike intentionalism) neglects 
the beneficiary’s imagination with which a Lutheran would approach a text.  Unlike 
ideological textualism, which focusses on the words themselves, as if their meaning 
is a separate objective reality ultimately unrelated to those who write or read such 
words, true giftedness is not most importantly about the characteristics of the gift 
itself.  The gift, the text, is most important as it creates a relationship of the giver and 
the recipient.  The gift is a signpost, pointing back to the intention of the giver, and 
forward to the response of the recipient; but it also transforms intention and 
response, the relation of giver and recipient into the future.  Just as God’s giving of 
law is understood to be the expression of God’s compassion for human beings, so the 
giving of human law expresses a benevolent intention of the givers toward those who 
receive. In the case of the founders, for instance, the Constitution may be  thought of 
as their expressed desire to leave an institutional legacy of freedom and equality 
within the constraints of their culture.  In this sense, strict ideological intentionalism 
similarly rejects a giftedness approach by relifying the constitutional givers’ 
intentions inside the past moment, rather than accepting the motivation of the givers 
to leave a lasting legacy for a changing context.  Again, the theological predicate for 
a “gift” understanding is not necessary so long as analogy is employed. 
This relational understanding of interpretation transforms the attitudes and 
actions (for good or ill) of the givers toward those who are its beneficiaries.  And the 
response of the people, those who receive the gift, will shape the tenor of the social 
and political system in which they are immersed: their embrace of law, their 
resistance (whether self-interested or conscientious), or their willingness to scoff at 
or ignore it, will recreate the link between tradition, the present and the future 
generations.  
Luther described judging as this sort of gift relationship, that focusses on the 
relational rather than the propositional:   
For when you judge according to love you will easily decide and adjust 
matters without any lawbooks.  But when you ignore love and natural law 
you will never hit upon a solution that pleases God, though you may have 
devoured all the lawbooks and jurists. . . . A good and just decision . . . 
must come from a free mind, as though there were no books.  Such a free 
decision is given, however, by love and by natural law, with which all 
                                                                
174See, e.g., Braaten, supra note 71, at 37; GEORGE W. FORELL, FAITH ACTIVE IN LOVE 25, 
129, 146 (1954)(describing the divine institution and presentation of secular authority.)  It 
should be noted that at other times, when Luther is explaining God’s saving action, he 
describes law as God’s demand and grace as God’s gift, see Forell, supra note 108 at 85.  
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reason is filled; out of the books come extravagant and untenable 
judgments.175 
By contrast, as an ideology rather than a constraint, strict construction textualism 
borrows the divine watchmaker metaphor, neglecting the ongoing relational quality 
of the gift of the Constitution or of the laws.  In the watchmaker analogy, the 
legislator or constitutional “framer” sets the law in motion, expects the courts to 
ensure that the law runs smoothly and efficiently, and sees unexpected consequences, 
including human suffering or social dislocation, as obstacles to the smooth purring of 
the law.  Such a construction no more realizes the Lutheran concept of law as gift 
than it does the concept of moral relationship between lawmakers and public. 
B.  State-Sovereignism and Positivism: Toward Simultaneous Conflicting Loyalties 
A Lutheran View:    
1.  Natural law, understood as a dynamic creation of God, is precedent 
over positive law,176 and must be used to critically evaluate positive law;177 
it is always and universally valid, though constantly being transformed, 
while positive law is always situational.  Even the natural orders, 
however, cannot be so absolutized as to deny the freedom of God to do a 
new thing in the world.178 
Yet, paradoxically, government is ordained by God as a holy institution, 
as a creating act of God,179 and thus deserves the obedience and respect of 
those who live under its laws,180 even in some cases when they 
independently conclude that positive law will bring about moral injustice 
in the immediate case.181 
                                                                
175On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 702. 
176GEORGE W. FORELL et al., LUTHER AND CULTURE 14, 16 (1960). “In the state one must 
act on the basis of reason . . . for God has subjected the government of this world and the 
affairs of the body to reason.” Id. at 17 (quoting Luther’s Sermon on Keeping Children in 
School (1530)). Unlike the traditional account of natural law, however, Lutherans reject a 
static picture of creation in favor of an understanding that the orders of creation are dynamic 
and changing, because God is free to do new things in the world.  Moreover, Lutherans 
understand that the creation has been distorted by the fall, so that the “discovery” of natural 
law must always be viewed with suspicion.  Id. at 33-34. 
177LUTHER AND CULTURE, supra note 176, at 18 (quoting Luther’s Commentary on the 
Galatians).  In Luther’s view, “[l]aw binding for rulers as well as the ruled because . . . it is 
ultimately rooted in God’s will and authority.” Id. at 13. 
178Braaten, supra note 71, at 35. 
179Id. at 32, 37. 
180Luther quotes Romans 12, “authority which everywhere exists has been ordained by 
God.  He then who resists the governing authority resists the ordinance of God, and he who 
resists God’s ordinance will incur judgment.”  On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, 
at 659-60. 
181Luther’s strong stand against rebellion was in great part pragmatic and proceeded out of 
his strong focus on care for the neighbor and recognition of authority as God’s gift.  He noted 
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2.  The government of this world imposes order upon the unjust;182 and its 
symbol is the sword used to restrain evil,183 while the governance of Christ 
redeems.  Luther argued that both governments are necessary, the spiritual 
to bring righteousness and the temporal “to bring about external peace and 
prevent evil deeds.”184  Yet, as a creation of God, the secular government 
goes beyond the use of force, and exercises an office similar to a parent, 
nourishing and caring for its people. 185  Luther called for a four-fold 
responsibility in the ruler:  “true confidence and earnest prayer” toward 
God; “love and Christian service” toward the subject; “untrammeled 
reason and unfettered judgment” toward other government officials; and 
“restrained severity and firmness” toward evildoers.186  Yet, he 
acknowledged that a competent ruler need not be a Christian, that 
“‘Caesar does not need to be a saint,’” so long as he uses reason to 
exercise his authority.187 
3. The Christian, who lives under the law and yet not under the law, and 
for the neighbor,188 is called not to forsake government, but to serve God 
                                                          
that insurrection “is devoid of reason and generally hurts the innocent more than the 
guilty. . . .The harm resulting from it always exceeds the amount of reformation 
accomplished. . . .”  LUTHER AND CULTURE, supra note 176, at 53 (quoting Luther’s An 
Earnest Exhortation for All Christians Warning Them Against Insurrection and Rebellion 
(1522)).  Yet, Lutheranism calls upon Christians to resist the evil even of governors, to 
“admonish and punish them on account of their injustice,” Strieter, supra note 73, at 43 
(quoting Luther’s weekly sermons on John 16-20 (1528-29)), giving rise to debate about the 
proper limits of conscientious disobedience. 
182As Luther explains, “Therefore God has established magistrates, parents, teachers, laws, 
bonds and all civil ordinances, that, if they can do no more, at least they may tie the devil’s 
hands so that he cannot rage after his pleasure.”  LUTHER AND CULTURE, supra note 176, at 10 
(quoting Luther’s Commentary on Galatians (1535)). 
183
“[I]t is God’s will that the temporal sword and law be used for the punishment of the 
wicked and the protection of the upright.”  On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 
661; see also id. at 665. 
184On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 666. 
185To the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany, Lull supra note 109, at 712-13; On 
Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 694 (exhorting the ruler to “serve and protect 
[subjects], listen to their problems and defend them, and govern to the sole end that they, not 
[the ruler], may benefit and profit from [his] rule”).  Braaten notes that “some Lutheran 
theologians prefer to speak of ‘orders of preservation,’ taking into account what God is doing 
to sustain the world under the conditions of sin, even using means sin-laden themselves, such 
as war and capital punishment, to fight against still more serious attacks on the goodness of 
God’s creation.” Braaten, supra note 71, at 34. 
186On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 700. 
187LUTHER AND CULTURE, supra note 176, at 29 (quoting Sermons (1528)). 
188Luther explains, “A man does not live for himself alone in this mortal body to work for 
it alone, but he lives also for all men on earth; rather, he lives only for others and not for 
himself.”  The Freedom of a Christian, Lull, supra note 109, at 616, 617. 
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in government if the neighbor’s needs demand it.189 Yet, the call to serve 
goes to others besides Christians; it is part of the natural law which stands 
in critique of all positive law, especially that which does not adopt care as 
its first principle.190 
Lutherans employ the metaphor that human beings stand in (at least) two worlds, 
simultaneously.  As Esbeck and McConnell point out, the belief in dual loyalties to 
God and world is not peculiar to Lutheranism, but the way in which Lutherans 
resolve this problem is distinctive.  Other traditions try to resolve this tension: those 
who understand that they must choose between God and the world either separate 
from the world or commit themselves to warfare against government when it 
demands action in violation of the separationist’s radical faith commitment.191  As 
suggested, in McConnell’s scheme following Niebuhr, some traditions align 
themselves with culture; and compromise any tension between the Christian’s 
commitment to this world and to his faith, understanding culture through Christ and 
Christ through culture.192  
Lutheranism, as McConnell points out, refuses to resolve this tension by 
separation, battle, or compromise.  However, Lutherans understand their relationship 
to the world to be somewhat more positive than McConnell would describe it.  
McConnell, following Niebuhr, describes Luther’s view as: 
the Christian cannot escape his attachment to the sinful world and owes it 
a certain allegiance, but . . . the demands of the world and the demands of 
God are in inherent tension with one another. “[M]an is seen as subject to 
two moralities, and as a citizen of two worlds that are not only 
discontinuous with each other but largely opposed.”  The only ultimate 
resolution of this struggle is redemption through the death and 
resurrection of Jesus. . . .”[T]he dualist joins the radical Christian in 
pronouncing the whole world of human culture to be godless and sick 
until death” . . . but “the dualist knows that he belongs to that culture and 
cannot get out of it.”193   
Lutheran church statements, by contrast, suggest that the Christian does not live 
in the world as a person wishing but not able to escape his attachment, nor a person 
who gives his allegiance to it grudgingly.  A most recent Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America statement on the subject of church in society explains, “God does 
not take the Church out of the world, but instead calls it to affirm and to enter more 
deeply into the world.  Although in bondage to sin and death, the world is God’s 
                                                                
189The Freedom of a Christian, Lull, supra note 109, at 617-619, 674. 
190See, e.g., Braaten, supra note 71, at 34; ROBERT BENNE, THE PARADOXICAL VISION:  A 
PUBLIC THEOLOGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 82 (1995), Whether One May Flee from a Deadly 
Plague, Lull, supra note 109, at 738-741. 
191See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text. 
192See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
193McConnell, supra note 79, at 210 (quoting H. Richard Niebuhr, CHRIST AND CULTURE 
(1951)). 
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good creation, where, because of love, God in Jesus Christ became flesh.” 194  Yet, 
paradoxically, “the presence and promise of God’s reign makes the church restless 
and discontented with the world’s brokenness and violence.  Acting for the sake of 
God’s world requires resisting and struggling against the evils of the world.”195 
The possibility of simultaneous conflicting loyalties does not appear often in the 
jurisprudence of William Rehnquist. Those who have analyzed Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinions at length note that as between individual or group rights and state/federal 
law, Justice Rehnquist nearly always sides with the government.196  His strong 
defense of private property is anomalous, an exception perhaps  referencing his 
political history rather than his jurisprudential views.  Moreover, he nearly always 
resolves federal-state conflicts in favor of the state.197  Indeed, some commentators 
have described Justice Rehnquist’s role as very deferential to other branches of 
government,198 though his recent advocacy on behalf of an independent bench raises 
the question whether he is changing his views slightly.199  
                                                                
194Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, A Social Statement:  The Church in Society:  
A Lutheran Perspective 2 (August 28-September 4, 1991). 
195Id. at 3. 
196See, e.g., Davis, supra note 113, at 24; IRONS, supra note 13, at 51, 123; Zeppos, supra 
note 113, at 680; Ronald W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the 
Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 2 (1995). As suggested earlier, the one exception has 
been in affirmative action cases, Savage, supra note 13, at 301.   
197Zeppos, supra note 113, at 680. Such deference is not always to rights-claimants’ 
disadvantage, where two rights-claimants are in a dispute.  See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. 
Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), where Rehnquist’s majority opinion found that 
the federal court should have abstained from intervening in a sex discrimination case filed 
against Dayton Christian schools by the state because of comity and federalism concerns.  Id. 
at 626-27. Johnson and Martinis also claim that Rehnquist favors the state over sovereign 
Indian nations, which is truly an anomaly since states have been virtually excluded from 
power over Indian tribes since Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).  Johnson & 
Martinis, supra note 191, at 7-8, 18, 20-22.  They also argue that Rehnquist has rejected 
fundamental caselaw on issues such as federal trust responsibilities, Indian sovereignty, Indian 
jurisdiction. Id. at 8-17. 
198See, e.g., Irons, supra note 13, at 63, 127; Savage, supra note 13, at 319 (describing 
Justice Rehnquist’s view in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), that the 
U.S. government need not follow Fourth Amendment protections for non-citizens; decisions 
for the government in nearly all criminal cases).  Such deference is reflected in his choice of 
the lowest of the three levels of the rational basis test. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
425-26 (1961) (“[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional 
power. . . . A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may 
be conceived to justify it”); see, e.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 640-41 
(1974)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 178 
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) 
(review of military regulations “far more deferential” than others; courts must give “great 
deference” to the professional judgment of military authorities regarding the importance of a 
military interest); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“extremely great” deference due states on questions of economic legislation). Assistant 
Attorney William Rehnquist noted that “‘Disobedience cannot be tolerated, whether it be 
violent or nonviolent disobedience. . . .  If force or the threat of force is required in order to 
enforce the law, we must not shirk from its employment.’”  Savage, supra note 13, at 40.  Yet 
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A particularly important subtext to Rehnquist’s theory on constitutional 
interpretation is his emphasis on delegation.  In his view, the Constitution delegates 
specific and quite restricted powers to the federal branches—the executive, the 
legislature and the federal judiciary—and reserves “the remaining authority normally 
associated with sovereignty to the States and to the people in the States.” 200  
Similarly, the judiciary’s duty is simply to prevent transgression of the other 
branches’ authority boundaries, not to assess the wisdom of their actions.201  His 
views on delegation and constitutional jurisdiction square with what at least one 
reviewer of his work calls Rehnquist’s revival of “the long-absent doctrine of state 
sovereignty,”202 discrediting “the conventional wisdom that there were virtually no 
enforceable judicial limits on congressional power.”203  Indeed, he is one of the few 
members of the Court who has attempted to keep alive the notion that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits only national, not state, establishments of religion.204   
Yet, Justice Rehnquist’s self-description of judges as “keepers of the covenant” is 
probably a more accurate account of his own understanding of his jurisprudence.205  
Rehnquist defines this covenant primarily as the promise of the federal branches of 
government not to exceed the powers delegated to them.  Indeed, he has been 
                                                          
he was apparently speaking only of individuals, as Rehnquist wrote that police and federal 
agents could hold Vietnam War protesters indefinitely without charges, and suggested that the 
executive branch, including the Army, could be trusted to “police itself” from abusing 
constitutional rights.  Id. 
199See, e.g., Rehnquist Unhappy with Planned Inquiry, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 1, 1996, 
at 3A (warning against micromanagement of judicial system and need to protect judical 
independence); David S. Broder, Space for a Judge, WASH. POST, April 4, 1996, at CO7 
(chastising Senator Bob Dole and President Clinton for threatening a federal judge’s job after 
a controversial decision); Rehnquist Warns on State of Court System, 14 NAT’L L.J. 5, Jan. 13, 
1992, at col 1.  Merrill disagrees with the standard wisdom on Rehnquist, noting that Justice 
Rehnquist deferred to only about 64% of state agency interpretations, sometimes more and 
sometimes less than the Court as a whole. Merrill, supra note 114, at 653-54. Oddly, 
Rehnquist does not express the same deferential concerns when it comes to previous judicial 
decisions through embrace of stare decisis.  See Shapiro, supra note 114, at 290-91, 419; 
Merrill, supra note 114, at 657-59. 
200Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 778 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
201See Davis, supra note 113, at 31. 
202D. DAVIS, supra note 13 at 20.  Davis notes that when Rehnquist believes federal action 
encroaches on the states’ authority, he is quick to use judicial review. Id. at 23-26. 
203D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 20.  See, e.g., Rehnquist’s insistence that there is little 
evidence that Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was not intended “to override the 
traditional sovereign immunity of the States.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1978). 
204See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97-100 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
Wallace represents a case in which Rehnquist makes a “cultural Christian” rather than a 
public-private argument, as he does in other Establishment Clause cases at times, suggesting 
that religion is part of the fabric of our culture.  Id. at 97 passim. 
205William H. Rehnquist, supra note 3 at 698; D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 20.  It is 
interesting that Rehnquist would borrow covenantal language from some part of his history. 
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scarcely deferential to Congress or the federal executive when they have violated the 
sovereignty of states or their practical ability to govern.206   
That covenant, however, does not recognize that judges may have conflicting 
responsibilities to states, Congress and individuals at the same time.  Indeed, 
Rehnquist has worked to “dispel” the “cliche” that the Constitution is a charter that 
guarantees rights to individuals against the government, rather than a balancing act 
among all of the “players” in the constitutional system.207  In one study of his votes 
between 1976 and 1981, Rehnquist sided with state governments in more than 80% 
of all cases (compared with the majority at 52%); sided with criminal appellants in 
only 12% of the cases (vs. majority which went for criminal defendants 41% of the 
time); and held for First Amendment plaintiffs in 16% of cases (compared to the 
majority’s 44%).208 
One way to explain Justice Rehnquist’s state-sovereignism is to accept his self-
understanding as Court prophet, calling other Justices back to the source of 
constitutional power—the people—and the key notion of limited government.  That 
is, Rehnquist might be understood as rhetorically attempting to restore constitutional 
balance209 by reminding us that the Constitution does not simply recognize the 
individual and the federal government as the only constitutional actors or audience.  
In Usery, for instance, Rehnquist asserts, “[A] state is not merely a factor in the 
‘shifting economic arrangements’ in the private sector of the economy, . . . but is 
itself a coordinate element in the system established by the framers for governing our 
Federal Union.”210  And in “The Notion of a Living Constitution,” he points out: 
The people are the ultimate source of authority. . . .They have granted 
some authority to the federal government and have reserved authority not 
granted it to the states or to the people individually.  As between the 
branches of the federal government, the people have given certain 
                                                                
206D. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 19-21. 
207Davis, supra note 113, at 41 (citing William H. Rehnquist, Government by Cliche, 45 
MO. L. REV. 379 (1980)). An unvarnished view of how Rehnquist may view individuals who 
dissent from government demands may be his response to anti-war protesters during the 
Vietnam era, when he aligned all of the left with the Weathermen, claiming,”[t]he very notion 
of law and of a government of law is presently under attack from a new group of barbarians.  
Just as the Barbarians who invaded the Roman Empire neither knew or cared about Roman 
government and law, these  new barbarians care nothing for our system of government and 
law.  They believe that the relatively civilized society in which they live is so totally rotten 
that no remedy short of the destruction of that society will suffice.”  Irons, supra note 13, at 
51-52; Savage, supra note 13, at 39-40. 
208IRONS, supra note 13, at 63.  In Free Exercise cases, Rehnquist has nearly always voted 
against the claimant as well.  See SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 322.  One survey notes that 
Rehnquist has voted with Scalia and Thomas 83% of the time since they have been on the 
court. Joan Biskupic, Balance of Power, WASH. POST, July 5, 1996, at A13. 
209Clor, supra note 132, at 561 (quoting REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT at 317-18). 
210Davis, supra note 113, at 33 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 
849 (1976) (citations omitted)). Indeed, Justice Rehnquist points out that power is also 
reserved to the people, although he does not pursue what that might mean apart from his 
presumption that the people vest their power in the first instance in the legislation and agency 
of state government. 
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authority to the President, certain authority to Congress, and certain 
authority to the federal judiciary. . . .Marshall said that if the popular 
branches of government . . . are operating within the authority granted to 
them by the Constitution, their judgment and not that of the Court must 
obviously prevail.211 
Indeed, Rehnquist is keen on restoring respect for states’ discretion, even in joint 
federal-state projects.  For example, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,212 Justice 
Rehnquist dissents from the majority’s holding that Congress’ requirement that 
Medicaid-granting states pay reasonable and adequate fees to medical providers 
means that findings on those fees must be correct, arguing:  “[T]he Court’s 
suggestion that the States would deliberately disregard the requirements of the statute 
ignores the Secretary’s oversight incorporated into the statute and does less than 
justice to the States.”213 
Rehnquist’s “keepers of the covenant” dissents might be superficially understood 
as implementing a Lutheran doctrine of orders, “the common structures of human 
existence, the indispensable conditions of the possibility of social life.”214  In the 
Lutheran understanding, God has provided certain social arrangements or 
organizations, which are “prior to and apart from belief in Christ,” that ensure our 
care.215  In his time, Luther identified the church, the state, and the household 
(oeconomia) as these orders,216 although Lutheranism has recognized that other 
divinely given orders come into being as human needs and communities changed.217  
Although these orders function “apart from and in tension with the Christian 
revelation,” Lutherans have consistently understood that, as an order, the state 
exercises its rightful power or role in restraining evil and in nurturing good,218 and 
the branches of government use their distinctive competences toward this end.  
Luther spoke to the special vocation of magistrates to “punish evil and protect the 
good” as God’s servants and “workmen.”219  For a judge who serves within such an 
order to have a God-given vocation to fulfill a need in forming and securing human 
community requires both humility about the limits of one’s competence and 
jurisdiction.  It also requires support for the callings of others and the role of the 
different orders in the securing of a just and humane future. 
                                                                
211Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 696. 
212496 U.S. 498 (1990) (challenge by a nonprofit association of public and private 
hospitals to Medicaid reimbursement rates; the Court determined that providers have a cause 
of action, under the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, if states fail to adopt reasonable 
and adequate rates). 
213Id. at 528 (Rehnquist, dissenting). 
214Braaten, supra note 71, at 34. 
215Id. at 32. 
216Id. 
217STRIETER, supra note 73, at 193-96 (discussing views of Robert Bertram and Edward 
Schroeder). 
218Id. at 32. 
219On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 674. 
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A Lutheran doctrine of vocation can be borrowed analogically into a philosophy 
of judicial restraint or balance of judicial power with the responsibilities of other 
branches of government and individuals in securing these goods.  Indeed, Luther 
himself understood that conflicting interests and peoples would tend to check both 
each other and the power of the rulers.220  If there is no political authority to 
overbalance judicial interpretation of public values and call the intellectual blindness 
or stubbornness of the judiciary to account, the Lutheran understanding of a bound 
heart and mind would counsel for institutional self-restraint, and for a willing ear to 
the judgments of other authorities.221   
However, the thorough-goingness of Rehnquist’s commitment to state power and 
state rights, even in those cases when the balance of power does not appear 
threatened by individual rights or federal governmental action, suggests that his 
commitment to so-called “state’s rights” is more than a corrective to a power 
imbalance, which would be called for by a Lutheran understanding.  Ironically, given 
his deep skepticism about individual plaintiffs, Rehnquist sometimes take umbrage at 
judges or litigants who question the motivations and actions of those with authority.  
In his view, for instance, the Court should not question the motivations of state 
officials,222 prison officials,223 employers,224 or schoolteachers;225 and should nearly 
always balance equities in favor of the state rather than the individual.226  Rehnquist’s 
distrust of  outsiders and his strong alliance with authority figures seems at least 
somewhat incompatible with  Lutheran doctrine that simultaneously recognizes the 
giftedness of authority and the fallenness of all (including the most powerful), which 
places conflicting demands upon the lawmaker. 
                                                                
220FORELL et al., supra note 174, at 38-39. 
221Forell, Luther’s Theology and Domestic Politics in MARTIN LUTHER:  THEOLOGIAN OF 
THE CHURCH, supra note 108, at 38-39. 
222In commenting on an NAACP challenge to Texas’ all-white primaries, young clerk 
Rehnquist noted that he took a “dim view of this pathological search for discrimination.” 
SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 37; see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983) (Rehnquist 
brushes past the problematic question whether state officials need to make a decision that 
textbooks are secular or religious). 
223Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 323 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
224See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (Rehnquist defends employers against what he believes is the majority’s 
suspicion that they coerce or maneuver injured workers into selecting a favorable jurisdiction 
for worker’s compensation claims). 
225School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 401 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (invalidation of shared time and community education programs in parochial 
schools “impugns the integrity of public school teachers . . . assumed to be eager inculcators 
of religious dogma . . . [and] . . . requiring ‘ongoing inspection’” (quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 
473 U.S. 402, 412 (1985)). 
226For instance, Rehnquist concluded that the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
would be irreparably injured if she were required to make $2.6 million in AFDC payments 
with little hope of recouping the money if she lost in litigation, while the welfare clients 
disputing her calculation of their income countable to reduce their welfare benefits can always 
collect the back AFDC payments due them if they ultimately win. Heckler v. Turner, 468 U.S. 
1305, 1307-08 (1984).   
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Similarly, Rehnquist employs legal metaphors which preclude even self-
criticism.  In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, for instance, 
Rehnquist responds to the Krishnas’ religious practice of sankirtan in the airport 
using the metaphor of  government as a proprietor, “managing its internal 
operations” when it controls public property rather than a rights-balancing 
approach.227  Yet the proprietor metaphor only makes sense in a system in which the 
government’s power and rights must be unrestrained, rather than part of a balance 
that includes the speaker’s rights and other individual harms, such as passengers’ 
need to “decide whether or not to contribute,” to the cause of their solicitors.228 
Rehnquist often explains his reliance on state legislatures as the key players in 
democratic decision-making by suggesting that the state is located closest to true 
democracy, or the will of the people.229  Moreover, he credits the states as the location 
in which the response to context might be taken most seriously, or as he says, the 
place where the problems of the future are to be solved.230 In his view, judicial 
review with national standards simply will “smother a healthy pluralism.”231  At other 
times, he has suggested that his preference for state sovereignty is simply realistic:  
whatever the Court may say about rights, in the long run the majority will have its 
way, so there is no use in the Court’s attempting to thwart the majority will.232  Fiss 
and Krauthammer give a third interpretation:  they locate the center of power for 
Rehnquist closer to the individual, describing Rehnquist’s state power focus as an 
                                                                
227See International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 
(1992).  Moreover, Rehnquist takes a strict approach to finding a dedication of property for 
speech purposes, noting the need for evidence that the government is “intentionally opening a 
nontraditional forum for public discourse” and that it is not a “special enclave.” Id. at 680 
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).  
Rehnquist even accuses the Krishnas of shady dealings; their organization “attempt[s] to 
circumvent” the history and practice of airport activity by “blithely equat[ing]” it to bus and 
train stations, and boat wharves. Id. at 681-82. 
228Id. at 683 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 734 (1990)).  Rehnquist’s 
opinion also equates the Krishnas with “the skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor [who] can 
target the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering physical 
impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation. . . . The unsavory solicitor can also 
commit fraud through concealment of his affiliation or through deliberate efforts to 
shortchange those who agree to purchase.”  Id. at 684. 
229Davis, supra note 113, at 24.  States similarly are arguably potentially more accountable 
to a public than judges, Davis, supra note 113, at 16, or national legislatures. Davis, supra 
note 113, at 24.  Macey notes, however, that Rehnquist seems sensitive to the problems of 
“interest groups in the judicial process” while ignoring these same problems in the legislative 
process.  Macey, supra note 137, at 592. 
230Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 699-700.  Davis notes that Rehnquist’s democratic focus 
may seem inconsistent with his record on free speech, where he gets marks for supporting 
protection of speech claimants in fewer cases than any other Justice, perhaps because he has 
expressed disagreement with incorporation of the Speech Clause to regulate states.  Davis, 
supra note 113, at 70-73.  In fact, Rehnquist has not sided with the speech claimant even when 
he also asserted a property rights claim, i.e., ownership of a flag or license plate.  Id. at 73-75. 
231Id. at 44-45 (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 606 (1980)). 
232See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 36. 
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attempt to be consistent with laissez-faire theory “which reduces the function of 
government to protecting private exchanges and the aim of the Constitution to 
protecting the rights and expectations of property holders.”233 
Whether Rehnquist’s views are simply state-sovereignist, motivated by a belief in 
the popular will, or ultimately individualistic, as a consistent ideology (rather than a 
constraining voice), they seem inconsistent with a Lutheran understanding of orders 
or vocation.  In the Lutheran view, institutions no less than human beings must 
constantly be challenged and corrected, for as human creations, they are as apt to fall 
into error and even perversion of their original purposes as any person.  Luther 
recognized that each of the orders—oeconomia, the church, and even the state—can 
be both fruitful and perverse at the same time.234   
Second, the freedom which God gives in the orders, including the states, permits 
human sinfulness, so that democratic acts are as likely to be an expression of 
individual self-interest as those of tyrants or even judges.235  Similarly, in the 
Lutheran view, even democratic authority can be exercised with blindness as well as 
insight, with the self-delusion that one is working for the common good when one is 
merely perpetuating evil.236  Indeed, from a conscience perspective, as deTocqueville 
recognized early, popular sentiment can be as tyrannical and can suppress individual 
judgment just as any other authoritarian scheme, and the whim of the majority tends 
to replace the demand of king or tyrant in a democratic society.237  
Yet, Rehnquist’s preference for legislative actions suggests a presumption of 
correctness simply because they are authorized by the people.  For instance, in 
Furman v. Georgia, he suggests that if a legislative body makes a mistake, the only 
repercussion is that a majority will is left in place; if a judicial body does so, the 
view of nine Justices is imposed upon an entire public.238  Such a justification of state 
acts on the basis of popular will rejects the insight that “there is no authority except 
from God; the authority which everywhere exists has been ordained by God,”239 so 
                                                                
233Davis, supra note 113, at 73 (quoting Owen Fiss & Charles Krauthammer, The 
Rehnquist Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1982, at 14, 21 (1982)). But see Macey, supra note 
133, at 586-89 (arguing that Rehnquist has failed to “check legislative excess” in favor of 
deference). 
234See Braaten, supra note 71, at 34. 
235Smith notes, “Henry David Thoreau, however, was hardly the only human being for 
whom it was not self-evident that a group acquires moral authority to command merely by 
virtue of numerical superiority.”  Smith, supra note 17, at 592. 
236See Macey, supra note 137, at 578-86 (describing how the Founders separated powers 
to check public interest group pressures). 
237ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 11-13 (Francis Bowen ed. & Henry 
Reeve, trans., Vintage, 1995) 
238Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467-70(1972).  See characterization in Davis, supra 
note 113, at 25. 
239On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 659-60. 
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that democracy itself can never be an ultimate justification.  Taken to its ultimate 
extreme, such a view, expressed as vox populi vox dei, is idolatrous.240 
Thus, Lutheranism has incorporated the responsibility of challenge to the evil 
done by the state as well as recognition of its authority.  A Lutheran is called to be at 
once obedient to and skeptical of authority, even that of a duly constituted 
government, though Lutherans have described the formula in which obedience and 
resistance are related in different ways.241  Yet, Rehnquist has missed this insight into 
the possible evil of majoritarianism throughout his life, from his early political days 
when he argued against a Phoenix civil rights ordinance because the majority was 
“‘well satisfied with the traditional . . . system’ and did not want it ‘tinkered with’ by 
‘social theorists’ who asserted a ‘claim for special privileges’ by the black 
minority.”242  In fact, in his perhaps most infamous professional opinion, arguing that 
his judge, Justice Jackson, should vote to uphold Plessy v. Ferguson,243 he claimed, 
“[t]o the arguments made by Marshall that a majority may not deprive a minority of 
its constitutional right, the answer must be made that while this is sound in theory, in 
the long run it is the majority who will determine what the constitutional rights of the 
minority are.”244  
Justice Rehnquist’s statist-majoritarian thrust can be explained by his 
commitment to legal positivism, i.e., the belief that no moral critique is available to 
substantiate the propriety of particular legislation.245  Rehnquist’s particular brand of 
positivism incorporates the separation of private and public values.  Though he 
                                                                
240I owe Howard Lesnick for this insight.  As Howard points out, the “popular will” can be 
heavily influenced by powerful elite interests, e.g., through heavy financing of political 
campaigns.  Letter from Howard Lesnick (May, 1997) (on file with author). 
241Strieter, for instance, describes four American Lutheran responsive models as the 
“participatory reform-resistance type” taken by William Lazareth and George Forell; the 
“christological-trinitarian” model preferred by Franklin Sherman and Larry Rasmussen, the 
“confessing movement” response of Robert Bertram and Edward Schroeder, and Carl Braaten 
and Robert Jenson’s “historical eschatological type.”  STRIETER, supra note 73, at 3. 
242IRONS, supra note 13, at 50 (quoting Rehnquist’s 1967 letter to the editor published in 
the Arizona Republic). 
243163 U.S. 536 (1896)(holding that “separate but equal” accommodations on public 
transportation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
244Rehnquist continued “One hundred and fifty years of attempts on the part of this Court 
to protect minority rights of any kind—whether those of business, slaveholders, or Jehovah’s 
Witnesses—have all met the same fate.  One by one the cases establishing such rights have 
been sloughed off, and crept silently to rest.  If the present court is unable to profit by this 
example, it must be prepared to see its work fade in time, too, as embodying only the 
sentiments of a transient majority of nine men. . . .I realize that it is an unpopular and 
unhumanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagues but I think 
Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be reaffirmed.”  SAVAGE, supra note 13 at 36.  In a 
now-infamous blemish on his moral character, in his confirmation hearings, Rehnquist 
attempted to disavow this statement, claiming it represented Justice Jackson’s views rather 
than his own, though Jackson’s secretary repudiated this account as “incredible on its face.”  
Irons, supra note 13, at 60-61; see also Savage, supra note 13, at 35-38; D. Davis, supra note 
13, at 7. 
245Davis, supra note 113, at 26-27. 
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sometimes advocates that individuals act on the basis of their moral beliefs, “the 
most common and most powerful wellsprings of action,” they cannot demand that 
others join them, for public values are validated only by the will of the people whom 
one can convince to vote the same way. 246  Rehnquist’s acceptance of the notion that 
conscientious decisions, like property decisions, are “personal” is (ironically for a 
state-sovereignist) streaked with a little autonomy ideology, which may also explain 
his strong defense of private property.   He once wrote, “‘[i]mplicit in each of our 
daily lives is the reliance on our right to act as we choose in areas not proscribed by 
law, and reliance that the law will be enforced against those who wrongfully 
interfere with this exercise of freedom on our part.’“247  Yet, Rehnquist has written 
that it would not be immoral or improper to repeat the entire Bill of Rights, since its 
“trump” value lies in its majoritarian source.248 
Rehnquist’s own positivist views have been held since early adulthood, as 
evidenced by his Stanford Daily editorial that opined, “‘moral standards are 
incapable of being rationally demonstrated’ . . . it ‘is logically impossible to weigh 
the merits of one of these emotions [about whether German officers should be 
allowed to speak on campus] against the other. . . . [O]ne personal conviction is no 
better than another.’“249  That these views are part of his judicial philosophy is 
demonstrated in his definitive “The Notion of a Living Constitution,” which 
castigates non-interpretivist judges: 
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is no 
basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may serve as 
a platform for the launching of moral judgments.  
There is no conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to you 
that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your 
conscience, and vice versa.  Many of us necessarily feel strongly and 
deeply about our own moral judgments, but they remain only personal 
moral judgments until in some way given the sanction of law. . . .  
I know of no other method compatible with political theory basic to 
democratic society by which one’s own conscientious belief may be 
                                                                
246See, e.g.,Rehnquist, supra note 3 at 704-706; see also Davis, supra note 113, at 26-27 
(describing positivism as “moral relativism”); Clor, supra note 132, at 563 (describing 
Rehnquist’s views as “legal positivism with a vengeance,” in which justice cannot precede 
law). 
247IRONS, supra note 13, at 51 (emphasis added).  A judicial example is Patterson v. 
McLean Credit, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), in which Justice Rehnquist initially wanted to write an 
opinion determining that the Civil Rights statute on discriminatory contracts, 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, should not be made applicable to private employers.  Savage, supra note 13, at 190. 
248Merrill, supra note 114, at 633 (citing William H. Rehnquist, Government by Cliche, 45 
MO. L. REV. 379, 390-92 (1980)). 
249IRONS, supra note 13, at 48 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Emotion vs. Reason, 
STANFORD DAILY (editorial)) (emphasis added). 
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translated into positive law and thereby obtain the only general moral 
imprimatur permissible in a pluralistic, democratic society.250 
Justice Rehnquist specifically disavows that laws are generally accepted “because 
of any intrinsic worth [or] because of any unique origins in someone’s idea of natural 
justice. [I]nstead [they are accepted] simply because they have been incorporated in a 
constitution by the people.”251  Indeed, Rehnquist quotes Holmes approvingly for 
skepticism about natural law arguments;252 and rarely recites a moral argument in 
support of a state’s position.253   
Rehnquist’s positivism and his consignment of moral questions to the private 
sphere unless they can obtain the assent of a majority represents a complete 
disavowal of the Lutheran position that natural law ultimately trumps positive law.254.  
Of course, Lutheran doctrine simultaneously recognizes the office of the authority 
and the responsibility to honor those who hold the office, even to the point of 
refusing rebellion.255  However, nothing about Lutheran doctrine suggests that 
Christians should be quiet in the face of evil or even neglect by those who exercise 
their office.  In fact, Luther himself never used any excuse of office or jurisdiction to 
avoid castigating the rulers of his own time: 
The temporal lords are supposed to govern lands and people outwardly.  
This they leave undone.  They can do no more than strip and fleece, heap 
tax upon tax and tribute upon tribute, letting loose here a bear and there a 
wolf.  Besides this, there is no justice, integrity, or truth to be found 
among them.  They behave worse than any thief or scoundrel, and their 
temporal rule has sunk quite as low as that of the spiritual tyrants.256 
Yet Rehnquist’s state-sovereignist conception of government leaves little or no 
room for institutional challenge or epideictic criticism of office-holders, or claims 
that law or public policy is based on the tyranny of self-interested public will or the 
fallen institutional judgment of parallel lawmakers.  Rehnquist’s view of the Court’s 
ability to challenge is simply jurisdictional:  it is only when “these branches overstep 
the authority given them by the Constitution . . . or invade protected individual 
rights” that “the Court must prefer the Constitution to the government acts.”257 
                                                                
250Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 704, 705. 
251Id. at 704; IRONS, supra note 13, at 32. 
252Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 704-05. 
253A notable exception is New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, in which 
Justice Rehnquist argues that the state could logically conclude that it should enforce 
traditional “family values” by subsidizing intact families with married spouses and excluding 
parents who live together without benefit of marriage and their children from welfare benefits. 
411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
254Clor, supra note 132, at 564 (noting Rehnquist’s fondness for quoting Justice Holmes 
who debunks natural law and other claims that there is a right or goods). 
255On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 668-69. 
256Id. at 683. 
257Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 696. 
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By contrast, a Lutheran jurist would be bound to morally criticize the state for its 
substantive failures, not simply its failure to observe its own jurisdictional limits or 
promises.  Even a Lutheran jurist who believed that jurisdiction is an expression of 
the orders, a manifestation of God’s will for each of the three branches of 
government, would feel obliged to exercise his epideictic authority to call the other 
branches to account.  
Justice Rehnquist steadfastly refuses to acknowledge this responsibility.  As one 
example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,258 Justice Rehnquist refuses 
to say, with the majority, that the democratic decision of the people of Cleburne to 
ban a half-way house for mentally retarded people is the product of fear, ignorance, 
distaste, and dislike of retarded people.259  Even a Lutheran Justice who was 
committed to an expansive view of the responsibility of a democratically chosen 
legislative body to decide even wrongly, even a Justice who thought that a Court 
opinion was likely to have no useful effect,260 would feel bound to denounce 
decisions based on ignorance and resentment.  Thus, even if Justice Rehnquist were 
right in challenging a more rigorous “rational basis” application in City of Cleburne, 
he is not excused from admitting rather than avoiding the basis for the City’s 
decision. 
Moreover, contrary to the natural law tradition accepted by Lutherans, which 
posits a moral order given by God through human institutions, Rehnquist’s thorough-
going positivism claims that no moral critique is available to judge the actions of 
either individual or government, whether democratic or not.  Rehnquist treats moral 
decisions as appropriate only to the “private sphere,” refusing to acknowledge the 
public dimensions of moral choice as natural law and Lutheran doctrine assume.  
When Eddie Thomas calls on the state to grant him unemployment compensation 
because he conscientiously refuses to work on gun turrets, Rehnquist suggests that 
such decisions may well be “purely ‘personal philosophical’“ or “personal 
subjective” ones, not demanding state protection.261  
In accepting the public/private divide, Justice Rehnquist neglects the Lutheran 
insight that it is possible to have simultaneous conflicting commitments.  The public-
private metaphor, which imagines human beings shuttling back and forth between 
                                                                
258473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
259Rehnquist does exercise an epideictic role sometimes; a rare case where it was 
exercised “against” the decision was in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), 
where Rehnquist’s opinion excoriated Hustler’s cartoon while upholding it under the First 
Amendment.  See SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 162. 
260See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 32 (quoting Rehnquist’s 1964 letter to the editor 
published in the Arizona Republic) (describing attorney Rehnquist’s view that public 
accommodations laws would only result in blacks and property owners “glowering at one 
another across the lunch counter”); id. at 77 (quoting clerk Rehnquist’s memo that indicated, 
“It is about time the Court faced the fact that the white people of the South don’t like the 
colored people:  the constitution . . . most assuredly did not appoint the Court as a sociological 
watchdog to rear up every time private discrimination raises its admittedly ugly head.”); 
Larisa, supra note 151, at 208 (quoting author Rehnquist’s opinion, as stated in his book THE 
SUPREME COURT (1987), that Court challenge to legislative majority decisions set the Court 
“in the process of sowing a wind, with the whirlwind to be reaped years later”). 
261Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec Div, 450 U.S. 707, 723 (1981). 
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their private lives and public lives, suggests that private matters are beyond public 
reach or critique, while public matters are fully subject to scrutiny, discussion and 
regulation by the community.  Thus, sexuality (and its manifestations, such as 
viewing pornography, selecting a sexual partner, choosing whether to procreate or 
not) is out of bounds for moral conversation or legal constraint so long as it stays in a 
private space; once it becomes public (adult movie theaters, public nudity, a request 
for public funding for an abortion), the individual is at the moral and legal mercy of 
the community.  Or pollution of the earth cannot be questioned when it affects only 
one’s “private” property, but once it has the potential to affect public concerns, it is 
up for the highest scrutiny.  
In the McConnell typology, Church Apart from Culture or Church in Conflict 
with Culture groups would tend to accept the private-public split as perhaps a 
necessary evil, and thus the legal implications I have described.262  Churches Aligned 
with Culture groups might tend to refuse to accept the split (or substantially narrow 
the private sphere), and determine that most aspects of one’s life are potentially the 
subject of government regulation, so that private morality, communications and 
actions could be regulated by the whole except for good reasons.263   
By contrast, analogizing from the Lutheran understanding, the debate over the 
line between private and public can be substantially reframed if one understands the 
human being to be simultaneously committed to the conflicting demands of the 
relationships in which she lives, with family, friends, local community, and nation-
state.  The line between private and public becomes meaningless, because the 
relevant metaphor is relational, not spatial.  The tensions between such relations, and 
the structures in which the human is placed, cannot be resolved by reference to a 
black-letter command of the Bible, nor “locating” one’s activity in the private or 
public. 
Indeed, even the priority of relationship (with God as first) does not resolve the 
tension of conflicting demands between one’s proper loyalties.  That priority merely 
puts such demands in proper perspective: these simultaneous conflicting demands 
are not ultimate demands on the self.264  And they are most likely infected with sin 
and resolvable only in brokenness—that is, with unwarranted pain to one or more of 
the demandants.  But resolution of those demands, even through a legal rule or 
decision, is ultimately not a matter of salvation, either for the self or for the world. 
To give just one example, the question whether the state may enter Michael 
Hardwick’s partially open bedroom and arrest him for sodomy,265 or confiscate 
Stanley’s pornographic pictures266 does not, in the Lutheran understanding, 
intrinsically come down to the question about where the spatial line between private 
and public is drawn. Even if one made a practical argument on Lutheran grounds that 
some clear boundaries for state intervention must be established by law, a Lutheran 
would not conceptualize the problem in “property line” terms.   
                                                                
262See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
263See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
264See Braaten, supra note 71, at 35. 
265See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
266See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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Rather, a Lutheran would understand the moral problem as one of conflicting 
loyalties, to the individual person, the intimate relationships that might be involved, 
the community of friends in which Hardwick or Stanley lived, the larger community, 
and the state.  To give the “right” to Hardwick or Stanley or to give power to the 
state is to take moral action which is always burdened with fallenness and 
responsibility for the actor and for those around him.   Nothing about Lutheran 
theology reflects the understanding that moral decisions (whether Hardwick’s or 
Attorney General Bowers’) are personal and autonomous; moral action is always 
responsive rather than autonomous, responsive to God, to the community, and to the 
neighbor.   
C.  The Equality of Authority:  The Problem of Majoritarianism, Equal Protection 
and Individual Rights 
A Lutheran View:  Love for the neighbor, rightly understood, is the sole basis for 
ethical action, for both individuals and the government.  It is both the demand of the 
natural law and the response of freedom in the gift of God’s love and salvation.267  
Thus, love is expressed in wrath and in care. 
If there is one dramatic way in which Rehnquist’s jurisprudence departs from 
Lutheran theology, it is in a thorough lack of rhetorical concern for the neighbor.  
Concern for the neighbor is theologically based for Lutherans, for it is justified not 
by the worthiness of the neighbor nor by emphasis on moral self-improvement as a 
path to human self-fulfillment or eudamonia, but on what God has done for the giver.  
Yet, the premise that neighbor-love is responsive to God’s love need not be the 
predicate of a claim that government must act both responsively and realistically 
about the neighbor’s need.   
Lutheranism’s lifting up of care of the neighbor, including defense of the 
neighbor against evil even at the risk of grave loss or death to oneself,268 is perhaps 
its most remarkable aspect given Lutheran acknowledgement of the inherent 
sinfulness of both the neighbor and the self.  Normally, a “logical” corollary to the 
recognition of human self-interest would be that government should be framed to 
account for that self-interest, not in contradiction to it.  Yet, the Lutheran mandate to 
care for the neighbor is realistic about, and willing to denounce, the neighbor’s flaws 
and wrongdoing, while it does not justify disengagement or turning away from the 
neighbor who exhibits those flaws.  Rather, for the Lutherans, Christians must give 
their lives even for those who are most unworthy in conventional terms.269   
This seemingly contradictory stance of judgment and love can be explained, in 
part, by the metaphor of the two governances.  The Lutheran concern for the 
neighbor is at once a demand of both kingdoms, the kingdom of God where 
neighbor-love is responsive to God and the other, and the kingdom of the world, 
where the responsibility to care for the neighbor is built into the fabric of natural law.  
From natural law, all persons, whether or not Christian, discern the principles of 
justice and respect for human persons; and can describe a ground for human 
interaction that both prescribes and exhorts care for the neighbor, justifying the 
                                                                
267See FORELL, supra note 174, at 100-105; discussion by Robert Benne, The Lutheran 
Tradition and Public Theology, Lutheran Theological Seminary Bulletin 19-20 (Fall 1995). 
268On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 738-43. 
269FORELL, supra note 174, at 98-101, 103-104. 
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restraint and punishment of those who evilly transgress those boundaries.270  The 
Christian will, in Luther’s view, exceed his duties under natural law principles of 
judgment and obligation out of gratitude and responsive love to the Creator.271   
Perhaps the most critical misinterpretation of Lutheran texts for our purposes is 
the equation of the restraining and judging function of the law with natural justice, 
and the nurturing and sacrificial response of human beings with the Gospel.  In fact, 
Luther and his successors have underscored that natural law, and positive law as 
reformed by natural principles of justice, must be understood as having an 
affirmative role in helping and supporting the neighbor;272 that task is not consigned 
only to Christians.  Thus, even the godless judge or magistrate may be called to 
account if he does not exercise the “fatherly” responsibilities he has to see for the 
care of those who are particularly vulnerable. 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinions contain little evidence that he understands the 
distinction between disciplined love and lack of concern for the neighbor.  The 
epideictic text of Rehnquist’s opinions toward those individuals entreating the 
government can only be described as turning his back, whether it is to the 
conscientious claims of individuals challenging the state,273 or claims of need from 
the vulnerable.274  Rehnquist’s steadfast refusal to challenge any state action against 
vulnerable people, however ill-motivated, is one example.  When Congress 
attempted to get at “hippie communes” by refusing food stamps to unrelated people 
who lived in the same household in U.S.D.A. v. Moreno,275 Rehnquist recognized the 
possible unfortunate consequence of the law,276 although he would not talk about 
Jacinto Moreno, the plaintiff, directly.  Yet he pronounced, “our role is limited to the 
determination of whether there is any rational basis” for denying food stamps.277  
Since the government could “conceivably” have thought that the regulation would 
                                                                
270See Braaten, supra note 71, at 33-34. 
271See FAITH ACTIVE IN LOVE, supra note 174, at 86-88, 110-111; On Temporal Authority, 
Lull, supra note 109, at 668-69. 
272Id. at 663, 668-69. 
273IRONS, supra note 13, at 52 (quoting Rehnquist’s view that the conscientious objector 
owes an “unqualified obligation to obey a duly enacted law” and “does not fully atone” for his 
disobedience’” by serving his sentence).  In the Justice Department, Rehnquist referred to 
Vietnam protesters, for instance, as the “new barbarians.”  Id. at 51; SAVAGE supra note 13, at 
40. 
274See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 362 (“[w]here Brennan saw the best in the lowest 
of human beings, Rehnquist saw murderers, thieves and thugs”); Culp, supra note 172, at 609 
(calling Rehnquist “the most hostile justice toward claims of civil rights in this half century 
and . . . perhaps ever”); Phelps & Gates, supra note 114, at 572 (quoting Edward V. Heck, 
Civil Liberties Voting Patterns in the Burger Court, 1975-1978, 34 W. Pol. Q. 193, 202 
(1981), who states that “Rehnquist’s ‘voting record . . . is characterized by almost unstinting 
hostility to the assertion of civil liberties claims’“). 
275413 U.S. 528 (1973).  Justice Brennan labeled these regulations a punishment for “only 
those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their 
living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.”  Id. at 538 (emphasis added). 
276Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
277Id. at 545-46; see also IRONS, supra note 13, at 17-18. 
52https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/4
1998] THE JUSTICE WHO WOULDN’T BE LUTHERAN 695 
deny stamps to those households “which have been formed solely for the purpose of 
taking advantage of the food stamp program” (although no legislative history 
supported this conception), the statute could not be attacked.278 
Regularly, Rehnquist also implicitly refers to the “neighbor” who calls upon the 
state for assistance as a troublemaker, suggesting deep skepticism about the 
willingness of individual rights claimants to cheat the government.  More than 
Lutheran realism about human nature, both its good and evil, he expresses 
unremitting disdain for the character or situation in which such people find 
themselves.  For instance, in response to Eddie Thomas, the conscientious factory 
worker, he argues that granting benefits to people who refuse to do morally 
repugnant work based on “purely ‘personal philosophical choices’“ will mean that 
“[p]ersons will then be able to quit their jobs, assert[ing] they did so for personal 
reasons, and collect unemployment insurance.”279  Similarly, Fred Cruz, who 
demands the right to hold services with state assistance and for equal consideration 
of his religious activity in parole hearings, is met with some scorn: “The inmate 
stands to gain something and lose nothing from a complaint stating facts that he is 
ultimately unable to prove.  Though he may be denied legal relief, he will 
nonetheless have obtained a short sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse.”280 
Such skepticism is not reserved only for religious claimants, however.  Justice 
Rehnquist also suspects the motives of unconventional claimants, such as resident 
aliens whom he thinks will not apply for citizenship and will try to take advantage of 
                                                                
278Moreno, 413 U.S. at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
279Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 723 n.1 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
Rehnquist puts Thomas’ reason for refusing to make war instruments in the same category as 
“every personal subjective reason for leaving a job.”  Id. 
280Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, 
Rehnquist goes so far as to cite a prisoner account that writ-writers in prison are essentially 
con artists who rip off their “clients” and try to snow the courts with fantastic causes of action 
and fake citations.  Id. at 327 n.7; Charles Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CAL. 
L. REV. 343, 348-49 (1968).  Whatever the truth of the article, its relevance to Fred Cruz’s 
request for a hearing on his claim that Buddhists were being treated unequally in the prisons is 
a stretch.   
See also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986), where Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, overturns a lower court’s mandate that an employer who 
cannot demonstrate hardship must offer the employee’s preferred accommodation of his 
religious beliefs instead of the employer’s offer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).  The claimant, Ronald Philbrook, a Worldwide Church of God 
believer, asked the school board to permit him to use authorized personal leave for required 
religious observances (which was prohibited) instead of taking unpaid, unauthorized leave or 
scheduling medical leave on the same day. Id. at 62, 64-65.  Rehnquist noted that under the 
employee preference rule, “the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most 
beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of 
the conflict.”  Id. at 69.  Of course, Rehnquist holds no brief for secularists, either, noting that 
the First Amendment does not require the “extreme approach” of throwing the Court’s 
“weight on the side of those who believe that our society as a whole should be a purely secular 
one.”  Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).  
Rehnquist quotes approvingly from Justice Douglas’ famous Zorach v. Clauson language that 
begins, “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”  343 U.S. 
306, 313-314 (1952). Id. 
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the state;281 or ones he believes may come from a bribe-taking country or have a 
contemptuous attitude toward public service.282  Families involving unmarried 
couples, particularly women and their children, are another group that has come in 
for Rehnquist’s disapproval.  For instance, he wanted to uphold a rule denying 
benefits to children of unmarried parents, because “[t]he Constitution does not 
require that special financial assistance designed by the legislature to help poor 
families be extended to ‘communes’ as well.”283   
Indeed, Rehnquist suspects fraud in a vast number of claimants: speaking on 
Congress’ refusal to give some illegitimate children their father’s Social Security 
benefits, he described it as an appropriate “effort[] to cope with spurious claims of 
entitlement, while preserving maximum benefits for those persons mostly likely to 
be deserving. . . .”284  Even in Medicare claims, Rehnquist is suspicious: he notes that 
permitting Medicare claimants to come directly to federal court instead of the 
administrative hearing system will mean litigation by many a person who thinks 
“someday he might wish to have some kind of surgery.”285  Rehnquist adds, “it is of 
no great moment to the dissent that after [such litigation] that individual may simply 
abandon his musings about having surgery.”286 
                                                                
281Rehnquist acknowledges the state’s right to assume that aliens are unlikely to stay in the 
United States and “contribute to the future well-being of the State.” Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 
U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissenting from holding that New York’s refusal 
to provide resident aliens with higher education financial assistance because they refused to 
apply for naturalization when they could, violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
282Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 662 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Irons 
supra note 13, at 272-73. 
283New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 622 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); see IRONS, supra note 13, at 282-84, noting that Rehnquist stood alone in his 
consistent view that lawmakers can exclude illegitimate children from definitions of family.  
He had already expressed the view, as an assistant attorney general, “that the ERA would be 
‘almost certain to have an adverse effect on the family unit as we know it.’“  Id. at 298. 
284Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 638 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added); see also Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 289 (1979) (Rehnquist dismisses the claim 
of an unmarried, live-in mother of a dead man’s child for mother’s Social Security benefit, 
noting that the mother’s benefit was intended to protect the family unit by making the 
surviving parent’s “choice to stay home easier.”).  In Rehnquist’s view, however, it was not 
meant as a “system for the dispensing of child-care subsidies” to women who were not 
married to, and therefore didn’t have the expectation of support from, men by whom they had 
children.  Id. Moreover, Rehnquist compares the interest of these women’s illegitimate 
children as comparable to “those who are gratified in a nonmaterial way to see a friend or 
relative receive benefits.”  Id. at 295. 
285Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 625 (1984).  
286Id. Surprisingly, Rehnquist goes on to admit that such a problem will be routine because 
“millions of people, like Ringer, who desire some kind of controversial operation but who are 
unable to have it because their surgeons will not perform the surgery without knowing in 
advance [whether they will be paid].”  Id. at 625.  Yet, he is indignant at the thought “that 
those individuals, as well as Ringer, are entitled to an advance declaration so as to ensure them 
the opportunity to have the surgery they desire.”  Id. at 626; see also Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Rasmussen, 440 U.S. 29, 46 (1979), where Rehnquist 
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Even when he is not excoriating plaintiffs, Rehnquist’s opinions often evince a 
flavor of indifference in the problems of people coming to court for relief.287  For 
instance, he is a proponent of the position that unless government has placed an 
“obstacle in the path of” a fundamental rights claimant, the government has not 
violated her right;288 in abortion cases, he has refused to speak either in favor of the 
fetus’ right to life or the mother’s right to privacy or liberty.289  Similarly, to Air 
Force Captain/Rabbi Simcha Goldman’s plea that wearing his yarmulke is “silent 
devotion akin to prayer” required by his religious belief, Rehnquist responds merely 
that due to such rules, “military life may be more objectionable for petitioner and 
probably others.”290 
Of course, even Justice Rehnquist on occasion expresses concern for some 
claimants, particularly when the state is faced with competing claims on limited 
resources,291 though he favors those traditionally considered innocent and not 
responsible for their own plight,292 such as elderly or disabled married women.  Most 
notably, in Califano v. Goldfarb, he cites the “plight of [dependent] widows [as] 
especially severe,” justifying a presumption that widows are dependent on their 
spouses, while widowers must prove their dependency to get Social Security 
benefits.293  And in the majority opinion in Herweg v. Ray, he takes the unusual step 
of talking about nursing home patient Elvina Herweg more personally,294 ultimately 
upholding federal over state regulations in her favor.295 
                                                          
posits that maximum benefit limits for disabled workers’ families may have been retained “to 
discourage feigned disability, a consideration wholly inapplicable to death benefits.” 
287Rehnquist has tirelessly worked to eliminate Death Row subsequent appeals, thinking 
them wasteful and abusive of law enforcement. Savage, supra note 13, at 412; Culp, supra 
note 168, at 603-04 (discussing the resurgence of disregard for the interests of African-
Americans with the Rehnquist Court). 
288Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) (quoting Harris v. 
MacRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1001 (1982) 
(quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969)) (Rehnquist counters nursing home 
residents’ pleas that they were in danger of losing their Medicaid payments because of 
decisions that they should be transferred to a lower-level facility by saying that the threat was 
“quite realistic,” yet not “of sufficient immediacy and reality” to justify their bringing the 
lawsuit). 
289See SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 261. 
290Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509 (1986). 
291See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 278-79 (1974) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (newly resident poor compete with long-resident near-poor for free 
medical care); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979) (providing Social Security to 
unwed mother of deceased father’s child will reduce benefits to later married mother and her 
children). 
292For instance, in Maricopa County Rehnquist expresses a preference for taxpaying long-
term residents over new, poor residents; and in Boles, for the claims of the deceased’s wife 
and her children over those of his previous live-in girlfriend and her children. Id. 
293430 U.S. 199, 232-33 (1976). 
294Rehnquist’s opinion notes “Petitioner Elvina Herweg has been in a comatose state since 
August 1976 as a result of two cerebral hemorrhages.”  Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 270 
(1982). We also discover that Elvina’s husband, whose income is attributed to her, is a 
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Lutheranism offers a different epideictic and deliberative approach to the 
problem of equality of persons. Constitutionalists have had a difficult time framing a 
theory that will deal with the facts of real life:  that inequalities abound, from 
maldistribution of material goods to social inequalities of birth that are unrelated to 
inherent talents or virtues, to the life-contingencies which find otherwise equally 
matched individuals in very unequal life circumstances. Justice Rehnquist’s 
positivist approach recognizes existing inequities, but takes a no-moral-blame 
approach that gives a rebuttable presumption of propriety to current social and 
economic arrangements in any equality discussion.  In such a laissez-faire view, 
courts are not able nor responsible to deal with these inequalities of life, though they 
should perhaps “call” the government on intentional government malice against 
individuals if it is sufficiently obvious and grievous.  Rehnquist’s approach contrasts 
with others, for instance, the view that courts can respond to public inequalities, but 
not to private ones,296 or the formal equality approach,297  which also selectively 
defines cognizable inequalities according to various Equal Protection theories, such 
as political powerlessness, or human autonomy.298  While in these formal (selective) 
equality approaches, all real inequalities are not “seen” by the Court,299  radical 
equality theory tends to “see” all inequalities and redistributes  material possessions 
to compensate for them. 
                                                          
butcher, and that they have three children at home.  Id. One other case recognizing the needs 
of the poor is Rehnquist’s dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420 (1985), where 
Rehnquist dissents from invalidation of a public remedial education, clinical and guidance 
service program in religious schools, arguing such aid is “sorely needed,” although the case 
can be explained more by Rehnquist’s views on the Establishment Clause than on the role of 
constitutional courts with respect to the poor. 
295Herweg, 455 U.S. at 278. 
296See, e.g., David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality:  The Property-Rights Connection 
in a ‘Negative Citizenship’ Regime, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 9, 41-42 (1996).  Advocates of 
the public/private approach might call on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) to define 
the “public” very narrowly to include only those participatory rights which are inherent in 
democratic citizenship. 
297See discussion in Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution is Colorblind, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (1994).   
298Compare John Hart Ely, Policing the Process of Representation:  The Court as Referee, 
and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, in 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:  A READER 3-23 (John H. Garvey & T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, 3d ed. 1984). 
299I use the metaphor of vision because, ironically, Justice John Harlan’s pronouncement, 
“our constitution is color-blind” kicks off the debate about equal protection in the last century.  
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting.)  The constitutional 
interpreter “sees” the criteria used to differentiate, and then pronounces that the Constitution 
does not “see” it and therefore it cannot be used.  If, however, the judge refuses to “see” the 
criteria as a constitutional question, then the Constitution implicitly “sees” it as viable basis 
for difference.  Thus, a person who is denied a job because of her gender (an immutable 
characteristic and/or historically a basis for creation of insular communities of women) has a 
difference that the court “sees” and then (ironically) pronounces that the Constitution does not 
“see;” but if a person is denied a job because of her pregnancy, that difference cannot be 
“seen” by the court for purposes of adjudication (although her pregnancy can be “seen” by the 
legislature). 
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The problem with equality talk, however, is precisely in its selective vision: the 
Court narrows its vision to those things jurists believe the Constitution permits them 
to see, and disregards other inequalities in daily life, some of them disregarded 
because they are viewed as necessary to sustain a capitalist democracy.300  The 
Lutheran approach to the problem of inequality is to recognize it for what it is—a 
given and yet corrupted aspect of living in this world.   
Borrowing from ancient notions of station, Lutheranism recognizes the 
assignment of status in this life both as a gift of God’s endowment of vocation upon 
the individual and as the result of human greed for material possessions and 
hierarchical power.301  As a gift of vocation, any particular status in the world—
whether one is a garbage hauler or a governor—contains the capacity for fulfillment 
and the responsibility to do good.302  In that sense, all stations in life are “equal 
opportunity” stations, capable of providing for human happiness, well-being, and 
meaningful contribution.  Authority, in the Lutheran understanding, becomes an 
office, a responsibility, rather than a perquisite of a particular status which entitles 
the holder to dangle the lives of human beings for his personal whims.303 
Yet, as an assignment from a community formed by corrupt wills, any particular 
status inherently contains the diminishment of the human person and involves 
corrupt powerlust and resentment.  In that sense, all stations in life participate in, and 
subject their holders to, the very tangible evils that we commonly understand when 
we talk about inequality in any of its versions:  power or vulnerability in life and 
death, human respect or its diminishment, safety or precariousness of daily existence, 
material wellbeing or material hunger.  People in different stations may not 
participate in a precisely equal way in these evils, just as they may not participate in 
a precisely equal way in goods, but they all participate significantly. 
The Lutheran acknowledgement of the equally authorized stations of all persons 
makes it possible for a jurist to recognize and probe the corruptions attendant on all 
authority, and to expose them epideictically, even while affirming the authority itself 
and even many of its decisions.  Thus, unlike Justice Rehnquist’s jurisprudence, 
where the government, once authorized to take care of public property, becomes its 
“owner” and may use the property at its discretion, the Lutheran position recognizes 
the simultaneous authority of the individual and the state to stewardship of that 
property, and their common tendency to hoard it for their own purposes.  Or, in the 
refusal of treatment cases, Lutheran doctrine can recognize at the same time the 
authority of a parent’s conscientious decisions about his child’s medical care, and the 
state’s authority to care for its children, as well as simultaneously exposing the self-
                                                                
300Republican government, for instance, does not work unless the few represent the many, 
unless there are presidents, Cabinet members, and agency heads.  Capitalism does not work 
unless there is a boss for every worker, rich people whom the poor can aspire to be if they 
work hard, indeed poor people whom the rich must fear they will be if they don’t. 
301Braaten, supra note 71, at 34. 
302See The Freedom of a Christian, Lull, supra note 109, at 621; Braaten, supra note 71, at 
34.  Lutherans sometimes talk about the human agent as cooperator dei (cooperator with God).  
According to Duchrow, for instance, Luther explained that works are not “good through a 
person alone, but by acting in accordance with the office in which God has placed him.” 
STRIETER, supra note 73, 46-48. 
303See, e.g., On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 692-94. 
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delusion and self-interest of each in exercising that authority.  In such an 
understanding, individual rights do not “trump” majorities; nor do majorities 
overwhelm the conscience of the individual before the courts. 
Similarly, a Lutheran judge would take a different view of legislative outcomes 
than existing policy positions, liberal or conservative.  Some liberals and 
conservatives view government as potentially capable of making an impact on 
human efforts to make progress toward perfection of human nature.  For instance, 
some “liberals” suggest that government can change work attitudes of non-working 
welfare recipients simply by providing them with sufficient financial incentives to 
escape their economic and social setting,304 while similar-thinking “conservatives” 
suggest that the government should withdraw enough benefits to force welfare 
recipients into a moral lifestyle, including marriage and work in the mainstream 
economy.305  Another camp despairs the government’s ability to change human 
nature, proposing that only the individual who has accepted responsibility for his 
own moral, social, and economic development is likely to become a moral person in 
this sense.306  Proponents of this view might argue that privatizing the moral, social, 
and economic world of the individual citizen is most likely to bring about real 
change in the human condition, and excoriate any government response to human 
need (emotional or physical) as incapable of providing for human well-being, except 
for the “big” common needs such as security from external attack or 
transportation/communications networks. 
The Lutheran position does not understand the project of government to be life-
changing, in the sense that government can make “bad” individuals or cultures into 
“good” if only it hits on the right programs.307  Nor, however, does the Lutheran 
position accept the notion that the human condition is purely a private matter, and 
that government has no role to play in recognizing and responding to the situations 
of individual persons.  From the Lutheran position, what the government can and 
must recognize is human need (which it must alleviate) and human evil (which it 
must resist).308  The legal metaphor which perhaps best describes Luther’s view about 
the purpose of the law is the criminal “defense of others” metaphor, which permits 
and even obliges a person to come to his neighbor’s defense, whether from physical 
                                                                
304See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 28-31, 56-58 (1995). 
305Frank Block, et al. THE MEAN SEASON, 81-83, 85-88 (1987).  This view can extend to 
entire communities or culture as well, as evidenced by the debate on what should be done 
about the “culture of poverty.”  See, e.g., WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 112-35 
(1971); KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 260-65 (1983). 
306See representation of this position as Charles Murray’s in BLOCK et al., supra note 310, 
at 45, 115-16, 161-65. 
307However, Luther did believe that people’s conduct could be restrained by the law:  See, 
e.g., Lull, supra note 109, at 92. Braaten notes that “[t]here is among the orders no ideal 
state. . . .Every structure of life must be examined as to whether it measures up to God’s 
intention for it, whether in its current form it works for the common good in the service of 
justice, liberty, and community.”  Braaten supra note 71, at 35. 
308On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109 at 692-93. 
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attack or from want, without regard for himself, even (justly) harming the 
aggressor.309 
The theological position of Lutheranism on recognition of human need is radical 
in the preference of the other over the self, while not diminishing or refusing 
recognition to the needs of the self.310  As one example of this radical preference for 
the neighbor, when Luther is asked to recommend whether people should flee the 
plague, abandoning their communities including those who cannot flee, Luther has 
the same response to both the authorities and to those who are asking out of 
relationship to individual persons.  The governing authorities, those in public 
office—to include mayors, judges and the like—are “under obligation to remain,” for 
[t]o abandon an entire community which one has been called to govern . . . exposed 
to all kinds of danger such as fires, murder, riots and every imaginable disaster is a 
great sin.”311  However, even those who are not carrying on an official government 
office must prefer the neighbor’s wellbeing: anyone who does not run the risk of 
losing everything he holds dear in this life for the neighbor “but forsakes him and 
leaves him to his misfortune becomes a murderer in the sight of God.”312 
As the radicalness of that position is made possible by the theological claim that 
God alone saves, a legal theorist in American culture might analogically resort to a 
less radical claim—namely, that government intervention is rationally limited to the 
resistance of human evil and the alleviation of the need of the neighbor.  That is, one 
need not accept the Lutheran position, or indeed any theology, to conclude that 
neither government nor the individual human working on his own self-improvement 
is likely to achieve a vast improvement in the human condition.   
Such a position does not despair of human action, for human need and human 
evil continue to impel both individuals as neighbors and as holders of government 
office to act.  It does require acceptance of the possibility that government can be 
government both when it responds wrathfully to human evil, indifferent or 
malicious; and when it responds in care, indeed sacrificially on behalf of the needy, 
“for the betterment of the community.”    
                                                                
309Luther, for instance, argued that “a Christian should be so disposed that he will suffer 
every evil and injustice without avenging himself; neither will he seek legal redress in the 
courts but have utterly no need of temporal authority and law for his own sake.  On behalf of 
others, however, he may and should seek vengeance, justice, protection, and help, and do as 
much as he can to achieve it.”  On Temporal Authority, Lull, supra note 109, at 675; see also 
id. at 677.  In fact, Luther suggested that if the governing authority failed a Christian, he 
should suffer evil rather than avenge himself in the courts. Id. at 675. 
310See Braaten, supra note 71, at 37.  Responding to the plague, Luther noted, “It is not 
forbidden but rather commanded that . . . [we] avoid destruction and disaster whenever we 
can, as long as we do so without detracting from our love and duty toward our neighbor.  How 
much more appropriate it is therefore to seek to preserve life and avoid death if this can be 
done without harm to our neighbor. . . .”  Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plague, Lull, 
supra note 109, at 740. 
311Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plague, Lull, supra note 109, at 738. 
312Id. at 743. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
In 1990, Carl Braaten noted why the Lutheran tradition holds promise for dealing 
with the challenges of democratic pluralism.  In this tradition, he writes, Christians 
“have a double identity”: 
[T]he God of the gospel is for them also the God of the law, at work in the 
secular realm where the churched and the unchurched share a common 
ground.  This scheme allows that the rule of God in the public orders is 
not primarily in the hands of believers but is communicated to all persons 
through the natural orders and can be grasped through conscience and 
moral reason. 
There is for Lutheran Christians no secular world in which God is dead; 
there is no empty world into which believers have to introduce the law of 
God for the first time.  God is at work through his ongoing creativity and 
through the law that orders life in the world. . . .There is no sphere of life 
where God is not active through the law that impinges on the human 
conscience. . . . 
. . . Lutherans believe that we experience God’s law as the driving force 
behind the demands that human beings impose on each other as they live 
in community. . . . 
. . . The core of justice in all times and places is care for the neighbor.  
The force required to administer justice through law is the “strange work” 
of love (opus alienum) in public life.313 
This paradoxical position, in which Christians are at once believers and members 
of a world which does not recognize belief as a criterion for membership, is a 
powerful alternative to exclusivist politics which recognize revelation and personal 
conversion as a condition for moral good in the world.  Yet, it is a position which 
does not cast aside, privatize or subordinate the faith of the Christian believer to the 
concerns of the world, or reduce the radical demands and promises of the Gospel to 
moralisms or even a legal code.  It does not reject or separate itself from the 
fallenness of the world, nor does it confront the world as “other” than itself.  Rather, 
it confronts the demands of the neighbor for justice. 
As I have suggested, the Lutheran position contains both a more realistic and yet 
optimistic view of law-making than Justice Rehnquist’s judicial philosophy.  It 
recognizes at once the fallenness of all human beings and political institutions at 
every level, while refusing to desist from those fallen persons in their need, refusing 
to walk away from affirming criticism of those institutions that have served human 
need with blindness, self-interest, and short-sightedness as well as creativity and 
hope. 
Unlike Justice Rehnquist, the Lutheran position rejects both objectivity and 
relativism as ultimate ways of understanding the role of the orders, including judicial 
review.  It demands recognition of the role of the interpreter, the temptations to 
                                                                
313Braaten, supra note 71, at 37. 
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which she may succumb, and the way in which natural law must ultimately guide her 
deliberations for the good of a diversity of citizens. 
Yet, these kinds of arguments are precisely those which would make for a 
judicial confirmation “religion-hunt” of the kind that the Catholic justices have 
undergone.  The evidence on Justice Rehnquist suggests, however, that such hunts 
are likely to be fruitless, diverting the inquirer from more significant non-religious 
influences on judicial philosophy, as both Justice Rehnquist’s story and Justice 
Brennan’s confirmation suggest.314  It is perhaps unfortunately true that a 
confirmation process focussing on denominational membership may be self-
defeating, failing to smoke out what a judge believes about the Constitution or his 
own religion, while also being invidious—subjecting Catholics, Jews and other 
outsider religions to “faith-tests” not demanded of Protestants.315  Indeed, the task of 
asking Justices about their religious beliefs might impose peculiar moral taints upon 
the confirmation process.  As we review Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence, we must 
either ask if he didn’t mean it when he suggested that his religious beliefs would 
have nothing to do with his judicial decisions,316 or we must ask whether we have 
                                                                
314Justice Brennan, as Levinson interprets, is a particularly good example of the short-
sighted foolishness of denomination-typing.  His “anti-Catholic” pledge apparently obviated 
the need, in the minds of many senators, to ask him whether the other influences in his life—
his father’s union leadership and Brennan’s own judicial struggles with issues such as 
gerrymandering as a judge—might not influence his jurisprudence. Goldman & Gallen, supra 
note 138 5, 47 (1994).  As a result, President Eisenhower ended up with a “bum steer” from a 
conservative perspective—a Justice who predictably might be a liberal, looking at the other 
influences in his life. 
Moreover, such a “litmus test” may be self-defeating because it does not take seriously the 
possibility that a Justice—of any faith-persuasion—may not understand his own theological 
tradition. A judge’s or politician’s religious affiliation is at its best an informed creedal 
commitment; at worst, conformity to cultural practices and beliefs of an only nominally 
religious community or a way to rub elbows with a powerful elite necessary for an official’s 
personal advancement.  If the Senate does not call in a Catholic theologian to quiz Antonin 
Scalia on his grasp and acceptance of Catholic doctrine, then it will be difficult for either a 
Justice’s inquisitors or the Justice himself to recognize when his religious views are playing a 
role.   
Thus, a Senate that assumes that a Catholic will understand and apply Catholic theology 
may find itself surprised to discover: a) that Catholics don’t believe what the Senate thought 
they did, as Justice Brennan’s case points out; b) that Catholics don’t assume that their 
Catholicism has much to do with their job, as Justice Scalia’s record points out; or c) that 
Catholics may not know Catholic theology, and in fact be closet Protestants, Deists, or New 
Agers.   
315See Levinson, supra note 14, at 1056-58. 
316Brennan reports that by the time of his confirmation hearings, he had settled that he had 
a constitutional obligation “which could not be influenced by any of my religious principles.  
As a Roman Catholic, I might do as a private citizen what a Roman Catholic does, and that is 
one thing, but to the extent that that conflicts with what I think the Constitution means or 
requires, then my religious beliefs have to give way.”  Goldman & Gallen, supra note 134, at 
16.  While Levinson expresses doubt that the Catholic Justices ended up meaning what they 
say, he also suggests that vibrant constitutionalism might counsel against forcing Catholic 
justices (and other justices) into positivism as a way of ensuring that the religious and the 
judicial never mix, id. at 1078-80. 
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encouraged Justices to reconstruct that question so narrowly—i.e., in Brennan’s case, 
as a crass Kennedyesque question about whether he would “take orders from the 
Pope”—that they themselves will not realize when they have crossed the line from 
“strict” judicial interpretation to moral or even religious argument.317 
If we force religion underground, judges may easily mistake latent religious or 
moral beliefs for public policy, creating real monsters of vagueness or 
unpredictability, when they are not faced with a hard moral-formal choice, such as 
the Coverian dilemma of choosing between a Fugitive Slave Act or human 
freedom.318  As I have suggested, however, the more serious moral risk is that 
Justices will faithfully KEEP their promises not to mix religious beliefs and 
jurisprudential justifications. Although judges surely live in a sheltered world,319 
perhaps the most important source of self-critique for a judge is his or her faith.  
Despite caricatures of the mindless faithful, for a Justice coming from a mainline 
Western religious tradition (as most have come) faith is an encounter with the uneasy 
questions.  It demands that a religious person ask himself or herself when he is 
abandoning truth for convenience, when she is confusing the good with self-interest, 
when she is confusing political pressure with community good.  It is, of course, not 
the only challenge to a Justice’s own limitations and self-delusions; there are the 
                                                                
317Numerous statements suggest that Brennan at least instinctively employed natural law 
understandings in his jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 734-35 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of this Court’s most important roles is . . . securing . . . the 
legitimate expectations of every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth.”); 
Goldman & Gallen, supra note 134, at 38 (quoting Justice Brennan’s Holmes lecture, “[L]aw, 
when it merits the synonym justice, is based on reason and natural insight.”).  In light of his 
jurisprudence, that Justice Brennan demurred to the question suggests that he himself did not 
know about the Catholic tradition of natural law, or did not assume that the natural law 
tradition was “religious.”  Levinson suggests as much.  See supra note 15 at 1074. 
318Robert Cover described the moral-formal dilemma of anti-slavery judges conflicted 
over their legal responsibility to administer the Fugitive Slave Law and their moral beliefs that 
slavery was wrong. Robert Cover, JUSTICE ACCUSED 197-259 (1975). 
319Thus, justices will rarely be confronted about the validity of their longest-held private 
beliefs; and have only the same one-way conversations with newspapers and television that 
any of the rest of us has. Perhaps the most constant encounter with other-generational 
thinking, for example, is from a judge’s clerks.  Yet, many of them may be immediately out of 
law school, where the headiness of pure legal argument for its own sake is largely 
unencumbered by the tragedies and costs, humiliation and anger, the history and the 
communities of the litigants, even after the most sensitive legal education.  And Rehnquist 
describes his own group of clerks as follows:  “it would be all but impossible to assemble a 
more hypercritical, not to say arrogant, audience than a group of law clerks criticizing an 
opinion circulated by one of their employers.”  WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 
37 (1987).  According to Rehnquist, the clerks “like nothing better than to discuss and refine 
abstract legal issues.”  Id. at 48.  Mark Tushnet has similarly noted the heavy influence of the 
clerks. Mark Tushnet supra note 117 at 1327. Of course, the Justice has his/her colleagues, all 
of whom live in roughly the same socioeconomic, professional, and geographical cocoon.  
Although as Justice Rehnquist describes the Court’s review of cases, the influence of the 
justices on each others’ first impressions seems minimal, since the culture encourages justices 
to be “certain” and relatively final about their views on cases before they speak.  Rehnquist, 
supra note 114, at 290-95. 
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conversations of the present and the past, with human beings and ideas.  But faith, at 
least in these particular traditions, is always a challenge.320   
The major Western religions, at least, suggest that human beings are more likely 
to be deluded from within than from without.  If they are correct, then we have more 
to fear from the Justice who keeps his promise to lock away his religion than from 
the Justice who admits that it may influence him on occasion.  For example, had 
Justice Rehnquist felt himself permitted by his office to take the insights of his faith 
into public life, one central concern of his jurisprudence—judges’ need for humility 
before the democratic outcomes in a pluralistic moral culture—might have been 
better worked out than through his clinging to any other ideology, whether 
interpretive, political, or moral.  He is perhaps a good “poster child” for a new 
approach to the problem of religious values in judicial decision-making, an approach 
which proceeds cautiously by analogy and with respect for its own limitations. 
 
                                                                
320Perry also suggests that holding religious people to the standard of secular justification 
or other external critiqe requires them to ask questions about their own interpretation of 
tradition.  RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 5, at 84-85. 
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